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The first chapter uses a unique dataset on Brazilian party members and variation
from mayoral elections to examine the determinants of party membership in Brazil.
It starts by examining the effect of winning office on the membership of political
parties at the local level. The effect of interest is identified using a differences-in-
differences approach that compares changes in membership of parties that assume
office with changes in membership of all other political parties registered in a
municipality. The results indicate that winning office increases the membership of
the party of the mayor by 0.5%. In addition, political alignment with higher levels
of government has a significant effect on the membership of the mayoral candidate
party. Finally, the paper documents that party switching is one of the drivers of
the estimated increase in membership. The paper offers evidence in favor of the
hypothesis that party membership is driven by opportunistic motives in addition
to ideology.
The second chapter combines data on the universe of recipients of the Bolsa
Famı́lia program from 2005 to 2015 with data on party membership to inves-
tigate the returns to political loyalty. Specifically, it uses variation from mayoral
elections to investigate whether members of political parties that assume office at
the local level are more likely to receive social transfers. Regression results from
an IV estimation show that indeed members of the party that gained access to
municipal government are significantly more likely to receive the benefit. Addi-
tionally, it finds no evidence that members of parties that did not win office are
more likely to lose the benefit as a result of the electoral defeat. This chapter
offers direct evidence of material rewards to party membership.
The last chapter focuses on the impact of pay transparency on earnings inequality
in the Brazilian public sector. Differences-in-differences estimates show that the
disclosure of wages reduced the 90/50 decile wage gap across municipalities located
in states that adopted wage transparency in comparison to those located in states
that did not adopt the policy. There is also no evidence that earnings decile gaps
below the median were affected by the salary transparency policy, which indicates
that the effect of disclosure in the public sector was mainly concentrated at the
upper tail of the log earnings distribution. Finally, evidence presented suggests
that the effect on inequality compression is the result of lower returns to top
paid occupations rather than changes in employment. The paper suggests that at
the margin, top paid public sector employees are insensitive to changes in their
earnings, indicating that there are rents that accrue to holding these positions.
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Chapter 1
The Determinants of Party
Membership in Brazil
1.1 Introduction
This chapter combines longitudinal data on Brazilian party members and mayoral
electoral results from 1996 to 2012 to examine how winning public office affects
the membership of political parties at the local level.
Economists and political scientists have long been interested in the question of why
parties need members and why individuals join political parties. On the demand
side, members might be extremely important to run and finance parties, help with
political campaigns, provide electoral legitimacy, participate in the recruitment
of political candidates, anchor the party in civil society, mobilize voters and help
develop party policies (Nalebuff & Shachar (1999), Heidar (2006), Mueller (2007),
Mattozzi & Merlo (2015) and Scarrow (2015)).
On the supply side, most works that examine the determinants of party member-
ship build on the typology of incentives proposed by Clark & Wilson (1961) and
on the literature on political participation (Heidar (2006) and van Haute & Gauja
(2015)). The strand of literature that follows rational choice models typically ex-
plains membership through selective and collective incentives (Olson (1965) and
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Aldrich (1983a)). On one hand, with non negligible costs, participation solely
for promoting collective policy goals would not be rational since individuals could
free-ride on other members activities without the need to participate in politics
through membership. On the other hand, individuals might also have little incen-
tive to join a party if collective goods are the main driver of membership since
the probability that their activity would influence policy goals is typically low.
The provision of selective incentives, either related to the outcome of participa-
tion (such as material incentives or other types of private returns) or to its process
(such as ideological concerns, i.e., the desire to interact with like-minded individ-
uals), that are unrelated to collective goods could partially help to offset costs of
membership and help to explain its supply (Seyd & Whiteley (1996)).1
However, political parties have a limited ability to offer and deliver selective incen-
tives, which is consistent with the fact that in practice, parties attract only a few
individuals out of the voting population. Additionally, of those individuals that
join parties only a relatively small number remain active as members after join-
ing. To address these issues, Seyd & Whiteley (1992) propose a general-incentives
theory to explain the supply of party membership. Although instrumental mo-
tives (described by selective incentives) are still the main factor explaining why
individuals engage in membership, the model considers a larger array of incentives
that lie outside rational actor models. In addition to selective and collective in-
centives, non-instrumental motives that are not usually included in a cost-benefit
analysis, such as altruism (related to a sense of loyalty or emotional attachment
to the party) and social norms (related to the desire of gaining approval or respect
of others), also play an important role in explaining membership.
Nonetheless, the existing empirical literature offers few insights into why indi-
viduals join political parties. In part, this might be due lack of both adequate
micro-data on party members and convincing sources of exogenous variation that
would allow one to credibly isolate endogenous membership incentives from other
1For instance, Aldrich (1983b) notes that is the mixture of private and public goods incentives
that is necessary and sufficient to explain membership and activism of party members. Note
also that Seyd & Whiteley (1992) argue that while outcome incentives are private goods, process
incentives might be classified as club goods as a result of being non-exclusive for party members.
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motives. Most empirical research investigates the determinants of membership
through surveys among party members, providing causal relations that might not
be credible. In addition, recent empirical studies focus mostly on explaining the
decline in membership rates among developed democracies (explained by ideolog-
ical convergence in party platforms, development of alternative forms of political
participation driven by technological changes, social changes that result in indi-
viduals having less time to participate in politics, contexts of lower provision of
selective incentives, shrinking of group solidarity incentives, and government sub-
sidies to political parties) and its overall consequences for the political process
(Scarrow & Gezgor (2010), Whiteley (2011) and van Biezen & Poguntke (2014)).
Employing a unique longitudinal micro-data set on Brazilian party members, this
paper attempts to shed light on the determinants of party membership. In par-
ticular, it investigates whether an electoral victory at the municipal level affects
membership rates of parties that were successful in the electoral race. Note that
winning office gives political parties access to a variety of resources (such as public
resources, leeway to appoint local bureaucracy, brand recognition, opportunity to
implement its preferred policies, etc.) that could be employed to attract party
members. This is even more salient at the local level in Brazil given the decen-
tralized structure of the country in which municipal administrations play a large
role in the distribution of public goods and services. One could then expect that
parties successful in local elections would be more able to attract individuals with
selective incentives than parties that were not.
In order to identify the causal effect of winning office on party membership, this
study uses a differences-in-differences strategy across electoral cycles, comparing
changes in membership of parties that did run for office at the local level and were
elected with changes in membership of parties that did not gain access to office.
The baseline results indicate that winning office indeed boost the membership
political parties. In particular, considering all local elections held in Brazil from
1996 to 2012, differences-in-differences (DID) estimates show that one year after
an election the membership of the party of the mayor is roughly 0.5% higher.
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To overcome remaining identification concerns and to shed some light on how
the degree of political competition might affect membership decisions, this study
also uses a Regression Discontinuity design, comparing the membership share of
parties that barely won and barely lost office in closely contested elections in a
two party set up. The outcome of electoral races decided by a small margin is
typically determined by elements that are beyond the control of a political party,
providing an exogenous source of variation that allows us to evaluate how party
membership is affected by an electoral victory. This set up also allows us to isolate
instrumental motives (such as outcome incentives) from other types of incentives
that drive membership (such as collective incentives, altruism or social norms).
The estimates from local linear RD regressions suggest that winning a close election
indeed increases the membership of the party of the mayor by 1.5%. Note that
the comparison with DID estimates for the same sample (electoral races with only
two parties) indicates that political parties that won elections by chance seem to
attract more members than parties that won by a larger margin.
Overall, the results indicate that selective incentives seem to explain changes in
membership of political parties that assume office, which is in line with the fact
that local governments of Brazil have a significant power to distribute public re-
sources among their supporters. Consistent with this, the results also suggest that
all other parties that run in coalition with the party of the mayor observe an in-
crease in membership after elections (when compared to changes in membership
of parties that did not gain access to office), albeit the increase in membership is
more pronounced for the party of the mayor.
Additionally, evidence reveals that political parties in the losing coalition experi-
ence a decrease in membership as a result of an electoral defeat. These outflows
might be in part explained by individuals switching their membership status from
member to non-member. On the other hand, members of parties that lost the
electoral race might join parties that assume office to enjoy the spoils of victory.
If selective outcome incentives explain why individuals join a political party, then
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one might expect to observe that individuals leave political parties that were un-
successful in the electoral race and join those that were successful.
To investigate whether this is the case, this study then focuses on how winning
office affects cross party movements. The evidence presented indicates that party
switching explains 11% of the rise in membership observed in the main estimates.
Note that party switching is very common among Brazilian politicians. Although
this behavior is mainly driven by opportunistic motives or electoral opportunities,
it is also partially attenuated by policy preferences (Desposato (2006)). One could
then expect that party members would be more likely to move to parties that won
an election but this opportunistic motive could be mitigated by the ideological
distance between the party an individual is initially a member and the party he
moves to.
In this direction, this study shows that a one standard deviation increase in the
ideological distance between the party an individual starts and the party in power
at the local level reduces the probability of switching to the party of the mayor
by −0.07%. This indicates the existence of a trade-off between ideology and op-
portunism, providing evidence in favor of the hypothesis that party membership
is driven by opportunistic motives in addition to ideology.
Finally, the effect of winning office on membership is stronger when the party
of the mayor is the same as the party of the president in power at the national
level. This could indicate that the opportunistic motives driving membership in
Brazil are indeed instrumental with individuals joining parties in the expectation
of receiving private benefits derived from the relation between the federal and the
local governments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides
a brief background on Brazil’s institutions that are of interest in this analysis.
Section 1.3 describes the data used and presents basic descriptive statistics. Sec-
tion 1.4 discusses the empirical strategy and presents the paper’s main empirical
findings. Section 1.5 examines the dynamics of party affiliation. Finally, Section
1.6 concludes the paper.
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1.2 Institutional Background
1.2.1 Government, Electoral System and Political Parties
Brazil is a Federation with more than 5,500 municipalities, 26 states and 1 federal
district. Each municipality has an elected mayor (prefeito) and a local city council.
At the state level Brazilians vote for a governor and a state parliament, and at the
federal level there is an elected President of the republic and a national parliament,
which is comprised by a lower house and a senate.
Elections are held every four years on the same date throughout the country and
usually take place on the first Sunday of October. Federal and state elections occur
in year t and municipal elections in year t+2. Elected officials assume public office
in the first day of the year following an election (that is, for an election held in
October of year t the political mandate starts on the first day of January of year
t+ 1). Voting is compulsory for literate citizens between 18 and 70 years old and
since 1996 Brazilians have used electronic voting machines to cast their votes.2
Mayors are elected by a simple majority rule for municipalities under 200,000
voters and by an absolute majority rule (two-round system) for those over 200,000
voters.3 Once in office, mayors are subject to a two-term limit. City councillors
are elected under a proportional representation system with an open-list and face
no term limits.
Brazil has a multiparty system that is arguably weakly institutionalized (De-
sposato (2006) and Klanja & Titiunik (2017)). There are currently 35 political
parties registered at the Electoral Supreme Court. Political parties typically run
in coalitions, but votes cast on the ballot in mayoral elections are an expression of
2For illiterate citizens and voters between 16 and 17 and more than 70 years old voting is
optional. Note also that since 2008 the Electoral Supreme Court (which is the federal electoral
authority) started the re-registration of voters with collection of biometric data (in order to
identify voters through their fingerprints).
3If no candidate achieves the absolute majority in the first round, a runoff shall be held
gathering the two candidates with the highest number of votes (top two candidates), and the
candidate who wins the majority of valid votes (50 percent plus at least one vote) shall be
considered elected.
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preferences for the mayor’s candidate party.4 There are no term limits for political
parties.
1.2.2 Party Membership in Brazil
As reported in official records, 11.3% of Brazilian voters were members of a political
party as of October of 2016.5 Albeit the standard view suggests that official
statistics on party membership are usually overestimated, in October of 2009 the
Brazilian Electoral Supreme Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral - TSE) introduced
an online platform designed for a better management of party membership records
with the intent to mitigate existing discrepancies.6
The new platform, named Filiaweb, allowed parties to submit their membership
lists via web, helping the TSE to identify and cancel membership of fictitious or
deceased individuals. It also allowed the electoral court to regularly detect other
types of irregularities (mostly related to individuals holding multiple affiliations).
It finally enabled full public disclosure of membership information, which was a
step forward into the adoption of measures that promote transparency, which is
in compliance with the Brazil’s Access to Information Act (Law 12,527/2011).
In Brazil, party members play a key role in internal party disputes for leadership
and candidate selections. Based on the electoral law, parties must hold conventions
during electoral years to deliberate on coalitions and nominate candidates that
will run for public office.7 In some occasions, party members might participate
4Although it is mandatory to display all acronyms of political parties under the coalition’s
name in advertisement or publicity materials related to an election, when casting a vote in
elections for executive bodies (mayoral, governor and presidential elections) voters must type
the candidate’s number in the electronic voting machines.
5See Scarrow (2015) and van Biezen & Poguntke (2014) for an international comparison of
party membership rates.
6For instance, political parties might exaggerate their membership rates on purpose since
members are an important source of public legitimation. In addition, membership rates might
be inaccurate since there is no verification by external sources (Mair & van Biezen (2001)).
Speck (2013) suggests, however, that in Brazil most of these concerns were mitigated by the
introduction of the Filiaweb, with outdated records and unchecked databases being less the case.
Likewise, Ribeiro (2014) indicates that bias in membership rates seem to affect all parties.
7In particular, the Brazilian electoral law establishes that parties must hold electoral conven-
tions in electoral years between the 20th of July and 5th of August.
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in primary elections, directly deciding who will represent them in the electoral
race.8 However, even when there are no primaries, members might indirectly select
candidates through the election of party leaders that will be ultimately responsible
for choosing party candidates.9
Membership with a party is also one of the legal conditions to run for public office
in Brazil. In observance with this requirement parties must forward (twice a year)
a list featuring basic information on their members to the TSE that keeps records
and publishes the data.10
There is anedoctal evidence suggesting that Brazilian party members are rewarded
with employment in the public sector.11 There is also evidence of public resources,
in particular from social transfers, being diverted towards party members.12
Despite the fact that the bulk of political parties have written in their statutes that
members should make financial contributions to parties, membership fees are typ-
ically negligible. An exception is when members are competing for office or when
they are civil servants directly appointed by the party to the local bureaucracy
(Speck & Costa (2015)).
8For media coverage of these events see: g1.globo.com/sao-
paulo/noticia/2016/02/candidatos-do-psdb-prefeitura-de-sp-votam-nas-previas-do-partido
or inaldosampaio.com.br/termina-a-eleicao-primaria-do-pt.
9See for instance: anoticia.clicrbs.com.br/sc/an-jaragua/noticia/2015/05/filiados-ao-psdb-
escolhem-presidentes-dos-diretorios-municipais. Note that intra-party competition for candidate
selection (among party members) may vary across parties and localities. Strong and institution-
alized parties are usually more prone to promote participation of their members. Nonetheless,
anedoctal evidence indicates that in some cases boards at the state or national level select the
candidates that will run for office at the local level.
10Note that the TSE is also responsible for enforcing compliance with the electoral law. Specif-
ically, the Brazilian Political Parties Act (Law N. 9,096/1995) establishes that candidates must
meet the following eligibility criteria to run for elections: to be a Brazilian national; to be capable
to fully exercise their political rights; to be registered to vote; to have their electoral domicile
established in their electoral district; to be a member of a unique political party; and to meet
the minimum age requirements for holding office for the different levels of government.




12See for instance: folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/10/1355336-mais-de-2-mil-politicos-eleitos-
receberam-bolsa-familia-ilegalmente
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1.3 Data Description and Descriptive Statistics
1.3.1 Data Description
The main data source for this study is a dataset on Brazilian party members pub-
lished by the Electoral Supreme Court. This data lists all individuals that are
currently members of a political party in Brazil, with their names and surnames,
date of birth, gender, a geographical location of their affiliation (that is, the mu-
nicipality and electoral jurisdiction in which those individuals are registered to
vote), their party of affiliation, their electoral identification number (that is, their
voter’s card number), and the start and end dates of their membership (in case of
termination).
Individuals can have multiple spells of membership in the data (where a member-
ship spell is defined as a continuous period of membership with a given party) but
the electoral law restricts membership to a single party and voting district at the
same time.13 Additionally, the data is longitudinal but incomplete since political
parties that ceased to exist (either because of merging or extinction) before the
data was posted online by the TSE do not appear in the dataset.14
Table 1.1 shows basic characteristics of Brazilian party members as of October of
2016, including information on demographics and length of membership. As men-
tioned, roughly 11.3% of Brazilian voters were reported as members of a political
party as of this date. As shown in the Table, women represent around 45% of
all party members. The majority of members are between 35 and 59 years of age
and have joined a party when they were, on average, 37 years old. In addition,
13Table 1.A1 in the Appendix shows the number of party members per occurrences in the
data. There are roughly 16,5 million individuals affiliated to a party with 78% of them observed
only once (that is, the majority of individuals either joined a party and are currently affiliated
with it or joined and left, without switching to other political parties).
14It is noteworthy that party merging is not an uncommon phenomena in Brazil. For instance,
PST, a party that won 11 races in the elections of 1996 and 2000 was incorporated into PL in
2003. Additionally, PRONA, that elected 3 mayors in the 2004 elections, merged with PL in 2006
creating a new party called PR. As an additional example, PSD, a political party that won office
in more than 100 municipalities between the 1996 and 2000 elections, was absorbed by PTB in
2003. Nonetheless, PSD was later recreated in 2011 (although with a different party number)
by former members of three other parties (DEM, PP and PSDB). A list with all political party
acronyms and names is presented in the Appendix of this chapter.
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a typical member remains in a political party for 7 years before either moving to
another party or changing their membership status to being a non-member.
In turn, Figure 1.1 illustrates the proportion of party members among voters
distributed in four education categories. Note that Brazilian party members seem
to be typically clustered among low and high educated individuals when compared
to voters in general.
In order to examine how winning office affects political membership at the local
level, this study combines data on party membership with municipal electoral
outcomes (also provided by the TSE). The electoral data contains detailed results
of all local elections held from 1996 to 2012. For the elections held in 2004, 2008
and 2012 it is also possible to identify all political parties that were running in
coalition with the party of the mayoral candidate. I also use data on elections
for higher levels of government (specifically, presidential elections) to examine
whether political alignment with the the president of the country plays any role in
the individual decision to become a member of a political party at the local level.
In particular, I use data on presidential elections for all the races that took place
between 1994 and 2010.
1.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Figure 1.2 presents the monthly evolution of the stock of party mem-
bers from September 1992. Dates highlighted in the horizontal axis correspond to
electoral periods with dotted lines indicating local elections and solid lines federal
and state elections. Although the top panel of the figure suggests that there was
an upward trend in membership over time, the increase in the number of party
members is mostly in line with the growth of the Brazilian electorate over the
period.15 Panel A also shows discrete gaps in membership, in particular between
federal/state and local elections, which are largely driven by inflows of new mem-
bers, as confirmed by Panel B shown in the bottom of the figure. Note also that,
15See Figure 1.A2 in the Appendix.
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although smaller in magnitude, Panel B also shows evidence of discrete increase in
membership after local elections, which could be an indication that political par-
ties that were successful in electing a mayor could also be successful in attracting
members.
Table 1.2 displays basic descriptive statistics on Brazilian mayoral elections from
1996 to 2012. Due to the nature of the data, electoral races with candidates
of political parties that merged with others or ceased to exist (and hence do not
appear in the party membership dataset) were dropped from the empirical analysis.
A total of 902 races were dropped from the final sample (out of 27,645) and of
those 834 were from the local elections of 1996 and 2000.
Over the period, elections with two candidates accounted for 50% of all mayoral
races as illustrated by comparing columns (2) and (3) of the Table.16 As shown
in column (4), there are typically 5 parties in each coalition competing for local
office. Candidates that won an election normally receive roughly 56% of votes.17
Finally, columns (6) to (11) illustrate the membership share of parties that won
and lost the electoral race in the month the election occurred. Columns (8) and
(11) highlight that in the month of the election the membership of those that won
office is significantly higher if compared to the membership of those parties that
lost the mayoral elections. In particular, as described in the last row of column
(8), the membership share of parties that had a candidate running and won the
election is roughly 5 percentage points higher than the share of members of parties
that had a candidate but lost the electoral race.
16Table 1.A2 in the Appendix illustrates the number of races of two candidates for each local
election by margin of victory of the winning candidate. Note that a large proportion of Brazil’s
mayoral races are highly competitive. For instance, races decided by an absolute margin of 5%
represent more than 25% of all races with two coalitions. Furthermore, elections decided by an
absolute margin of 2% account for more than 11% of all elections.
17Note that the vote share is expressed as the number of votes that the party of the mayoral
candidate received over the total valid votes in a municipality.
Chapter 1. The Determinants of Party Membership in Brazil 12
1.4 Electoral outcomes and Party Membership
This section examines if individuals join political parties as a result of an electoral
victory at the municipal level, which would indicate that selective incentives are
determinants of party membership. It begins by describing the empirical strategy
used to identify the effect of interest and then shows the impact of winning public
office on the membership of the party of the mayoral candidate. It then considers
whether other parties that were in coalition with the mayoral candidate during
the electoral race also face positive changes in membership and whether those in
the opposition face a drop in their membership as a result of the electoral defeat.
It finally examines if political alignment with higher levels of government boosts
the membership of parties that gained access to office.
1.4.1 Empirical Strategy
To estimate the effect of winning public office on party membership this study
relies on a differences-in-differences strategy that compares differential changes in
membership of political parties across electoral cycles. Although the data provided
by the TSE allows us to follow individuals over time and across political parties
and localities, this study focuses on a party level analysis, since an individual level
exercise with the full sample would be computationally challenging. The unit
of observation in the empirical analysis is then a party in a given municipality
and month. Note, however, that the party level model would provide us the
same estimate for the coefficient of interest than the individual level model with
the caveat that it does not include individual level controls in the regressions.
Nonetheless, the within party variation does not matter for the identification since
the treatment takes place at the party and municipality level. Focusing on one
electoral cycle, this study starts by estimating the following regression model:
Ypmt = α + βWpm ∗ dt + δpm + δpt + δmt + upmt (1.1)
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where Ypmt is the membership share of party p in municipality m in a given month
t, Wpm is a variable that equates 1 if a party p won the election in municipality m
and 0 otherwise, dt is a dummy for observations post election, δpm denotes party
x municipality fixed effects, δpt party and time fixed effects, δmt municipality and
time fixed effects, and upmt is an error term.
This empirical strategy uses all political parties that lost the mayoral electoral race
in a municipality as control for those parties that were successful in the mayoral
elections. The parameter β identifies then the effect of winning office through the
comparison of changes in membership of parties that won the local election with
changes in membership of parties that lost the election.
Note that this strategy has the advantage of controlling for party municipal specific
effects with δpm, which can account for unobserved characteristics of political par-
ties that change with locality (such as party ideology). It also absorbs any party
specific effects that are time varying and could explain changes in membership of
party p independently of the fact that this party gained access to office, such as
nationwide trends in membership or in policy preferences of political parties, with
the δpt control. It finally controls for changes in local socioeconomic conditions
or municipal institutions, potentially correlated both with electoral results and
changes in membership, through δmt.
It should also be noted that when all mayoral elections from 1996 to 2012 are used
to estimate the model, the parameter of interest, β, is a pooled coefficient, since
the observations from each of the five electoral cycles are pooled. As a result,
in the pooled regressions, the control δpm is not restricted to be the same across
elections and it does account for party municipal specific effects that vary with
the electoral cycle.
One potential concern with this identification strategy is that voters could antici-
pate electoral results and strategically move in and out of political parties before
the local elections are held, which would bias the estimated effect of winning office.
In addition, the effect might be driven by a reverse causality, since membership
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might be the cause of the electoral victory and not the other way around. To
address these issues, throughout the empirical analysis the posterior membership
share of parties (that is, their membership in each month after the electoral race)
is compared to their membership share in the month just before the elections were
held.
This study finally uses a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design following Lee
(2008), that exploits exogenous variation from close elections in a two party set
up, to deal with any remaining concerns regarding the proposed DID strategy and
to examine the potential bias in the DID estimates. To perform this exercise, the
sample is restricted to electoral races with only two parties (or two candidates)
competing for office. In each electoral cycle, a political party p is now assigned to
treatment in municipality m if Wpm = 1[MVpm ≥ 0], where MVpm is defined as
the vote share of the winner minus the vote share of its strongest opponent and
1[.] the indicator function. At the threshold MVpm = 0, assignment to treatment,
given by Wpm, sharply changes from 0 to 1.
The identification of the RD strategy relies on the assumption that in elections
decided by a narrow margin unobservables play a negligible role. Parties that
barely won and barely lost by a close margin should then be very similar in ob-
servable and unobservable covariates with the assignment to treatment around the
cutoff considered as good as random. To examine whether winning a close election
increases the membership of parties this work uses the following model:
Ypmt = α + βWpm + f(MVpm) + δpm + δpt + δmt + upmt (1.2)
where Ypmt and Wpm are defined as before and MVpm is the margin of victory.
The function f(.) is a smooth function of the margin of victory and includes an
interaction between Wpm and MVpm. The controls δpm, δpt, and δmt are defined as
in equation 1.1 and upmt is an error term.
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The proposed RD specification captures the effect of winning office on membership
at the cutoff by comparing the membership of parties that barely won and barely
lost an election within a locality. The RD model is then estimated both using a
parametric specification fitting a third order polynomial with a spline on either
side of the threshold MVpm = 0 and local linear regressions that restrict the
sample to observations that lie within a close vicinity of the threshold. Note that
the parameter β identifies now a slightly different effect in comparison to the one
described by equation 1.1, since the comparison group is restricted to the strongest
opponent of the party of the mayor that assumed office in a two party race set up
and the effects are measured around the cutoff MV=0.
1.4.2 Baseline Results
Table 1.3 presents DID estimates of equation (1.1) for different time windows after
the local elections were held. Note that for each electoral cycle the membership
share of each monthly window reported in columns (1) to (3) is compared to
the membership in a baseline period defined as the month just before the local
elections took place. The dependent variable in each regression is the membership
share of a political party p in municipality m and month t (multiplied by 100).
Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and regressions are weighted
by the overall number of party members in each municipality.
Overall, estimated coefficients presented in columns (1) to (3) of the table indicate
that winning an election significantly increases the membership of political parties.
For instance, estimates in column (1) suggest that, 1 to 12 months after an election,
the change in membership of the party of the mayor is roughly 0.1 percentage point
higher than the change in membership of parties that lost the elections. That is,
in the first twelve months after the electoral race, the membership of the party of
the mayor (which typically accounts for 20% of all party members) increases by
0.5% as a result of assuming office at the local level.
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Additionally, estimates reported in columns (2) and (3) reveal that the rise in
membership is significantly positive but relatively stable throughout an electoral
cycle. Specifically, the share of members of the mayoral candidate’s party rises by
0.75% and 0.5% in the second and the third years after the elections took place,
respectively. For simplicity, the rest of the empirical analysis will focus on the first
twelve months after the mayoral electoral race, which comprehends the first year
of the mayoral term.
Although results of the DID regressions presented in Table 1.3 can be explicitly
interpreted as evidence of selective incentives as drivers of membership as discussed
by Seyd & Whiteley (1992) and Seyd & Whiteley (1996), these estimates might
be downward biased if movements in and out of political parties mainly take place
before the elections for races where the margin of victory is expected to be large.
In an attempt to examine this issue, this study also investigates whether winning
office at the local level affects party membership in closely contested elections
where anticipation is less likely to happen.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.4 report estimated coefficients of non-parametric
and parametric RD regressions of the effect of winning the election on party mem-
bership for the first year after the elections were held. The nonparametric RD
specification is based on kernel estimators with an optimal bandwidth while the
parametric RD regression is estimated with a third order polynomial that uses
the full bandwidth.18 For comparison, column (3) in the table includes estimates
of a DID specification for the same sample (that includes only two party races)
and period. Note that columns (2) and (3) include the same set of controls as
described in Table 1.3.
18The optimal bandwidth was selected based on Calonico et al. (2014). Note that this proce-
dure selects a bandwidth that minimizes the mean squared error (as suggested by conventional
RD inference) and also corrects the standard errors to produce robust confidence intervals (Klanja
& Titiunik (2017)). Nonetheless, Table 1.A3 in the Appendix present estimates of alternative
RD specifications. Columns (1) and (2) of the table reports parametric RD estimates with the
control function approximated with 1st and 2nd order polynomials. Column (3), reports the
point estimate of a local linear regression with the optimal bandwidth chosen using Imbens &
Kalyanaraman (2012). The estimated coefficients reported in the table are in line with those
presented in Table 1.4.
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Estimates presented in columns (1) and (2) are in line with those presented in
Table 1.4, showing that winning office indeed increases the membership of the
party of the mayor. Specifically, column (1) shows that winning office by a small
margin increases the membership of a political party by roughly 1.5%. Consistent
with this result, the point estimate of the parametric RD reported in column (2)
shows that the membership of parties increases by 3%.
Note also that the RD design allows me to contrast close with safe electoral races.
Theoretically, it is not clear whether estimated coefficients of a DID specification
should be higher or lower than those of RD specifications that compare political
parties in highly competitive races. On one hand, parties that won by a larger
margin might have more political capital or support to implement policies than
parties that won by chance, which could explain a higher membership share in the
former with respect to the later. On the other hand, if elections are not decided by
chance voters could arguably be able to predict the electoral outcome and might
have no incentive to join parties after the race.
Column (3) reports estimated coefficients of a DID regression, which compares
changes in membership of parties competing in the two party race set up. The
presented point estimate indicates that the membership of parties that assumed
government at the local level rises by 0.6%. The sizable differences of estimates of
columns (1) to (3) suggest that indeed the degree of political competition matters.
The membership of political parties that won office in competitive races tend to
increase more than those of parties that won by a larger margin.
Figure 1.3 presents an RD plot that illustrates the effect described in column (2)
of Table 1.4. The figure shows the membership share in the future against the vote
margin received by the party with a running candidate in the previous election.
The lines in the graph correspond to 3rd order polynomial fits for control and
treatment units separately and the dots correspond to the sample mean within
each chosen bin (constructed using evenly spaced bins).19
19Note that the number of bins was selected in order to minimize the Integrated Mean Square
Error (IMSE) of the underlying regression function estimator as proposed by Calonico et al.
(2015).
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To check the robustness of the results from the proposed RD specification, Table
1.A4 in the Appendix of this chapter presents placebo local linear regressions of the
effect of winning the election on the pre-treatment membership share of political
parties that barely won office (in comparison to the membership of those parties
that barely lost the local elections). Point estimates presented in the table suggest
that there was no anticipation effect. That is, an electoral victory in t had no
effect on the membership share of parties that had a candidate and barely won
office if one looks to the period of twelve months before the elections were held.
1.4.3 Heterogeneous Effects
Mayoral Coalitions
As discussed in subsection 1.2.1, Brazilian mayors compete for office together with
vice-mayors and usually in coalition with other political parties. In addition, the
decentralized structure of the country makes municipalities responsible for the
provision of a wide range of public goods and services, giving mayors considerable
leeway to distribute public resources among supporters and appoint bureaucracy
to civil service jobs (Colonelli et al. (2017)). It is noteworthy to mention that
mayors typically appoint as deputy mayor’s (secretarios) both politicians or party
members of the other parties that composed their winning coalition. As a result,
the effect of an electoral victory on membership might not be restricted to the
party of the mayor and could drive affiliation of all parties within the coalition
that gained access to office at the municipal level. On the other hand, those
political parties that did compete for office but lost the electoral race might expe-
rience a differential decrease in membership. This could also be particularly more
salient for the party of the incumbent that was replaced in office. To investigate
whether this is the case, this study then estimates the effect of winning office on
the membership after elections for parties in all these different groups.
Note that information on the party composition of mayoral coalitions is only avail-
able for the local elections held in 2004, 2008 and 2012 (as argued in subsection
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1.2.1). In practice, this restricts the sample used in the proposed exercise to
these sub period with three electoral cycles (out of five), excluding the mayoral
elections held in 1996 and 2000. The empirical strategy follows the specification
illustrated by the equation 1.1 and includes interactions for each group of parties
that compose the party coalitions competing for office.
Estimated coefficients of this exercise are reported in columns (1) to (4) of Table
1.5. The first column shows estimates of the effect of winning the election on the
membership share of all parties that compose a winning coalition. That is, all
political parties that competed for office but lost the electoral race are included in
the control group. The second column, in turn, includes a dummy for the party of
the mayoral candidate that is in office, measuring if there is any additional effect
on the membership of the party of the mayor.
The point estimate reported in column (1) indicates that the membership of parties
in the winning coalition rises as a result of an electoral victory when compared
to the membership of parties that did not assume office. Specifically, winning the
elections increases the membership of the parties of the winning coalition by 0.1%.
This effect is, however, mainly concentrated in the party of the mayoral candidate,
as suggested by estimates displayed in column (2) of the table. In particular,
column(2) shows that while gaining access to office increases the membership of
the party of the mayor by 0.5%, the affiliation share of the other parties in the
winning coalition rises only by 0.02%. Note this effect could be in part explained
by the fact that the party of the mayor has arguably more leeway than the other
parties in a winning coalition to allocate local resources and to select public sector
workers.
The specification presented in the third column includes dummies for parties that
were part of the losing coalition. Note that the control group is now restricted to
the parties registered in the municipality that did not compete for office in the
election. Hence, changes in the membership of parties that compete for office and
won and changes in membership of those parties that did compete but lost are
now compared to changes in membership of parties that did not compete in the
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local election. Finally, the fourth column includes an additional interaction for
the party of the incumbent that lost office.
Notably, parties in a losing coalition face a decrease in membership as a result of
losing the election. Specifically, the point estimate reported in the third row of
column (3) suggests that the membership of parties in the losing coalition falls by
−0.03%. Interestingly, this is effect is stronger for parties that lost office (losing
incumbents) as shown by the estimate reported in the last row of column (4). In
particular, the decrease in membership of incumbent parties that lost the election
is of −0.5%.
In sum, the evidence presented in Table 1.5 reveals that the party of the mayor is
the main beneficiary of an electoral victory in terms of membership, in line with
results reported in Table 1.3. This result is robust to the comparison with different
control groups. Additionally, the membership of other parties in the winning coali-
tion also increases once this parties assume local government (when compared to
changes in membership of parties that did compete for office but lost and of those
that did not compete in the electoral race). Finally, the membership of parties in
a losing coalition decreases as a result of an electoral defeat, which indicates that
there is a net outflow of individuals from these parties.
Political Alignment
Intergovernmental transfers constitute an important source of resources to Brazil-
ian municipalities, representing on average more than 80% of the municipal rev-
enue. One could then expect that alignment with higher levels of government might
increase municipal resources. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that transfers
are employed to reward mayors aligned with the presidential coalition (Brollo &
Nannicini (2012)).20 That could be a source of influence in the individual decision
20In particular, Brollo & Nannicini (2012) exploit variation from close elections to investigate
whether discretionary federal transfers are used to reward aligned mayors able to run for a second
mandate. Their findings indicate that aligned mayors are more likely to receive transfers from
the federal government in the last two years of a first mayoral term.
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to join a political party, in particular, when this party assumes public office at the
local level.
Table 1.6 presents DID estimates based on equation 1.1 that attempt to exam-
ine whether there is any additional effect of winning an election if the party of
the mayor is aligned with the party of the president of the Brazilian republic. In
practice, the estimated specification includes an additional interaction between
the treatment dummy with a dummy equal to 1 if the party of the mayor that
won office is the same party as the president in power at the national level. Con-
trols included in this regression are the same as those described in the main DID
regression described by equation 1.1.
As expected, the point estimate presented in the first row of the Table is in line with
those illustrated in Table 1.3, although smaller in magnitude. In particular, there
is a significant differential change in the membership of the mayoral candidate’s
party in comparison to the changes in membership of all the other parties registered
in a municipality in the twelve month period after the electoral race (using the
month just before the election as basis).
Interestingly, the estimate reported in the second row of the Table shows that
political alignment significantly boosts the membership of the party of the mayor.
Precisely, when the mayor belongs to the same party as the head of the central
government, the membership of the mayoral candidate’s party increases by 1.7%.
This result is consistent with opportunistic motives for membership, with indi-
viduals joining political parties not only as a result of ideological preferences or
unobserved time varying characteristics of parties (that are partially controlled
by local specific effects that vary with municipalities and electoral cycle) but in
expectation of selective rewards derived from the relation between the local and
the federal government. It could also indicate that this opportunistic behavior is
driven by instrumental incentives (such as material rewards) rather than simply
showing that individuals prefer to be associated with parties that succeeded in the
local elections.
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1.5 Dynamics of Party Affiliation
Consistent with selective motives being one of the determinants membership, the
baseline estimates presented in section 1.4 suggest that the membership of po-
litical parties that were successful in local elections increases if compared to the
membership of parties that were unsuccessful. Part of this increase in membership
could be explained by party switching, which arguably implies a trade-off between
the opportunistic behavior of an individual and his ideological preferences. This
section attempts to shed light on this issue.
1.5.1 Role of Cross-Party Movements
Before examining whether ideology attenuates the opportunistic behavior of those
joining parties after the elections, this work first attempts to ascertain whether
the differential change in membership of parties that assume office is also driven
by cross-party movements and not only due to inflows of individuals that were not
previously members. To perform this exercise, I estimate the DID model described
by equation 1.1 for a restricted sample of individuals. Specifically, for each electoral
cycle, the sample includes only those individuals that are continuously observed
in the period of twelve months after the mayoral elections were held, using as
basis the month before each election takes place. This sample selection guarantees
that the membership share of parties in a municipality only changes as a result
of cross-party movements and not of inflows of new members or outflows from a
membership status to a non-membership status.
Table 1.7 reports estimates of the DID regressions for this restricted sample. As
in Table 1.3, the control group includes all parties that were not successful in
the local elections. The point estimate reported in column (1) is positive and
statistically significant, which indicates that individuals are indeed switching from
parties that did not assume office to those that won office. Specifically, winning
office increases the membership of the party of the mayor by 0.1% in this sample.
Chapter 1. The Determinants of Party Membership in Brazil 23
Note finally that this estimate is 0.07 percentage point smaller than the point
estimate reported in column (1) of Table 1.3.
1.5.2 Ideology versus Opportunism
The previous subsection has established that individuals strategically move from
political parties that did not assume office at the local level to those that won the
electoral race. However, party switching is a costly activity and its costs might
vary depending on the ideological distance between the party an individual is
initially a member and the party he decides to move (Desposato (2006)). One
might expect that opportunistic individuals are more likely to join parties that
assume government but would prefer not to join a party that is far from their
own policy preferences in the ideological spectrum in order to lower the costs of
switching.
To measure the relative probability of moving from a party k in a baseline period
before local elections to a party j in time period t after elections, conditional on
the fact that party j is in office in t, and to assess whether the ideological distance
between parties affects the relative probability of switching, this study estimates
the following regression model:
nkjmt = α + β0Wjmt + β1Wjmt ∗ distancekj + δkmt + δkjm + ukjmt (1.3)
where nkjmt is the proportion of party members that are in party j in month t and
municipality m but were in party k, in the same locality, one month before the
local elections were held (or the log of this ratio), Wjmt is a variable that equates
to 1 if the party of destination j is in office in t in municipality m, distancekj is
equal to |ideologyk − ideologyj| that measures the absolute value of the difference
in ideology (or policy preferences) between party k and party j, δkjm is a fixed
effect that controls for time invariant unobservables that affect both party k and
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j in municipality m,δkmt is a fixed effect that controls for unobservables that vary
with the party of origin k over time in a certain locality, and ukjmt an error term.
Note that this specification controls for local differences in ideology of party k
and party j, with δkjm. It also absorbs municipal specific trends in ideology or in
membership of party k, with δkmt. The Appendix of this chapter also includes a
fully saturated model that additionally controls forδjmt and δkjt and is discussed
below.
If cross-party movements occur in the direction of the party that did assume office
at the local level (the party of the mayor), as previously established in subsection
1.5.1, one would expect β0 to be positive in the above specification. Nonetheless,
if individuals are willing to switch to the party of the mayor but this effect is
attenuated by the distance in party position of party k and party j, then one
would also expect β1 in equation 1.3 to be negative.
Empirically, to perform this exercise, I consider individuals that were members
of any political party registered in a municipality at baseline (one month before
the local elections were held) and then follow their movements from baseline to
a maximum period of 12 months after the elections were held. As in subsection
1.5.1, the sample is restricted to individuals continuously observed as members
during this period.
To measure the distance in ideological preferences described by distancekj in equa-
tion 1.3, this study uses an index of party positions given by Power & Zucco (2009).
The index is based on survey responses from members of the Brazilian National
Congress and ranks parties from left to right on a scale of 1 to 10, respectively.
Estimates of party ideology, however, are only provided for the 11 main Brazilian
political parties. In practice, this additionally restricts the sample of the analysis
to 11 parties (that is, movements can only take place across these 11 parties).
Note, however, that despite the large number of political parties registered in
Brazil, as discussed in subsection 1.2.1, there is evidence of political concentration
both in terms of mayoral offices and party members towards some of the parties.
For instance, considering all mayoral elections that took place between 1996 and
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2012, the 11 main Brazilian parties elected 87% of mayors (on average). In addi-
tion, in the month each election was held, more than 93.3% of all party members
were affiliated to one of these 11 parties.21
In order to confirm that cross party movements also drive the effect of winning
the local elections on membership in this restricted sample of 11 parties, column
(2) of Table 1.7 shows the point estimate of the same DID exercise described in
the previous subsection but including only the 11 parties for which Power & Zucco
(2009) provide information on ideological preferences. In contrast to subsection
1.5.1, the control group in this specification does not include all other parties
registered in a municipality but is restricted to 10 out of the 11 parties for which
the information on ideology is available. Note, that the point estimate presented
in column (2) of Table 1.7 is positive and statistically significant and of roughly
the same magnitude than the one reported in column (1) of the same table.
Finally, Table 1.8 presents estimates of equation 1.3 that examines how winning
the election affects the relative probability of switching party and how this transi-
tion rate is further impacted by the distance in party position between the party
individuals are at baseline and the party they move to after elections. Columns
(1) and (2) of the table focus on the proportion of changers while columns (3) and
(4) on the log of this proportion. All regressions are weighted by the number of
party members in the party of origin k and robust standard errors are clustered
at the municipal level and reported in brackets.
Focusing on the log specification presented in the table, the point estimate reported
in the first row of column (3) indicates that individuals are significantly more likely
to switch to the party of the mayor after elections rather than staying in any other
party of the winning coalition or in the parties that did compete for office and lost
or even in the parties that did not compete in the election. Specifically, the relative
probability of moving is 0.72% higher for the party of the mayor that assumed
office in comparison to all other political parties registered in the municipality.
21To illustrate, Panels A and B of Figure 1.A3 in the Appendix of this chapter shows trends
of the five major Brazilian parties. At local elections held in 2012 these 5 parties together had
over 56% of their candidates elected as mayors. Moreover, over 50% of all party members were
affiliated to one of these five political parties.
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Note, however, that once the distance in ideology between the party voters start
at baseline and the party they move to during the first year after local elections is
taken into account, the relative probability of moving to a party j that is in office
rather than staying in party k decreases, although the estimated coefficient is not
significantly different from zero. Precisely, a one standard deviation increase in
the ideological distance of party k and party j implies a decrease of −0.10% in
the probability of moving to party j relative to staying in party k, as illustrated
in the second row of column (3).
Column (4) of Table 1.8 presents a specification that additionally controls for
time varying local specific characteristics of the party of destination j, such as
changes in policy preferences. Note that once this control is included the effect
of the party of the mayor being in office per se can no longer be identified. The
estimated coefficient presented in the second row of the column is negative and
statistically significant, which confirms the intuition that switching to winners is
less likely to take place the higher the ideological difference between the party that
assume office and the party an individual is initially a member. In particular, a
one standard deviation increase in the ideological distance of party k and party j
decreases the probability of switching to the party of the mayor (relative to staying
in other parties) by −0.07%
As a final attempt to add transparency and ascertain the robustness of the re-
sults illustrated in Table 1.8, columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.A5 presented in the
Appendix of this chapter show regressions of the same model in logs described
by equation 1.3, including an additional control to account for unobservables that
change with the party of origin k and the party of destination j over time (such
as the distance of policy preferences). Note that the inclusion of this control does
not alter the significance and barely changes the magnitude of point estimates of
equation 1.3 in comparison to those presented in Table 1.8.
In sum, the estimates suggest that selective incentives are one of the determinants
of party membership, with individuals switching from other political parties to the
party of the mayor. In addition, the evidence presented also indicates that there
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seem to be a trade-off between opportunistic and ideological motives for joining
a party, with ideological preferences attenuating the opportunistic behavior of
entering a party that was successful in local elections.
1.6 Summary and Conclusions
This paper exploits variation from mayoral elections to investigate the determi-
nants of party membership in Brazil. It first establishes that winning office signif-
icantly increases the membership of the party of the mayoral candidate successful
in the elections, which is consistent with the hypothesis that party membership is
explained by selective incentives.
Given that Brazil is a very decentralized country and municipalities are respon-
sible for providing a significant set of public goods and services, political parties
that assume office at the local level might have a significant leeway in allocating
resources to supporters and in appointing individuals to work in the local bureau-
cracy. In part, this might explain the effect of an increase in membership of parties
in power. It could additionally explain an increase in membership of parties that
run in coalition with the mayoral candidate’s party.
As expected, when compared to changes in membership of parties that did not gain
access to office, all parties in a winning coalition seem to face a rise in membership.
Nonetheless, the effect of winning office on membership is more salient for the party
of the mayor. Additionally, parties in the losing coalition experience a decrease in
membership as a result of the electoral defeat, which could indicate that individuals
are switching to the parties that assumed government.
Consistent with this, the results presented in this chapter show that cross-party
movements explain 11% of the differential change in membership of the party
of the mayor caused by a mayoral electoral victory. In addition, the evidence
presented suggests that individuals indeed switch to those parties that assume
local government, which is in line with the observed reduction in membership of
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parties that did compete for office but lost the elections. Party switching towards
winners is, however, attenuated by ideological concerns.
Finally, this study provides evidence that alignment with the party of the presi-
dent of the republic seem to explain most of the differential effect observed in the
membership of the party of the mayor. This result is also consistent with the in-
terpretation that party membership is driven by opportunistic motives in addition
to ideology.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1.1 Proportion of party members among voters by level of education
Notes: the figure shows the share of party members among voters by level of education as of
October 2016.
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Figure 1.2 Evolution of Party Membership in Brazil
Panel A: Stock of Members
Panel B: Inflows and Outflows of Members
Notes: the figures show the monthly evolution of party membership in Brazil from Oct/92 to
Oct/14. Panel A illustrates the evolution of the stock of party members while Panel B shows
the inflows and outflows. Vertical dashed lines indicate the time period that local elections
took place while solid lines indicate dates of federal and state elections.
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Figure 1.3 RD effect of winning the election on party membership
Notes: the figure presents a graphical description of the RD results described in Table 1.4 for
races of two candidates. The graph shows the fitted values from a third order polynomial
regression estimated separately on each side of the cutoff point. Note that the running variable
is the difference between the share of votes of the party of the winning candidate and the losing
candidate in the previous election. The range of the graph is limited to winning margins of 25
percent or less (in absolute terms).
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Table 1.1 Descriptive Statistics: Brazilian Party Members
Variables -
% of members among voters 11.3
% of members that are women 45.1









average age when joining a party 36.7
average years as a member 7.3
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics on Brazilian party members as of October
of 2016. The first row shows the share of voters that are members of a political party
and the second row the share of party members by gender. The third row illustrates the
distribution of party members by age. Finally, the fourth and last rows present the average
age of party members when joining a political party and the duration of their membership.
Source: TSE.
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Table 1.4 DID and RD Estimates of the effect of winning the election on
Party Membership (races with two candidates): local elections 1996 to 2012
Non Parametric RD Parametric RD DID
(1) (2) (3)





N 186,144 329,306 356,682
Notes: The table shows DID and RD estimates of the effect of winning the local
elections on the membership share of political parties. The sample is restricted to
races with only two candidates competing for office. Column (1) reports the point
estimate of the non-parametric RD regression while column (2) shows the estimate
for the parametric RD based on equation 1.2. Estimated coefficients reported in
column (3) refer to the DID regression described in equation 1.1. Controls displayed
in the specifications of columns (2) and (3) include time x party fixed effects, mu-
nicipality x party fixed effects and municipality x party fixed effects. Regressions in
columns (2) and (3) are weighted by the number of party members per municipality
with robust standard errors clustered by municipality and reported in parentheses.
Significance ***at 1% level, **at 5%level, *at 10%level.
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Table 1.6 DID Estimates of the effect of Winning the election on Party







Time x Mun. FE Yes
Time x Party FE Yes
Mun. x Party x Electoral Cylce FE Yes
Observations 12,671,540
R2 0.999
Notes: the table reports DID estimates based on equation 1.1 with an
additional interaction of the treatment effect with a dummy that equates
1 if the mayor that just assumed local office is from the same party of the
president of the republic. All regressions are weighted by the overall num-
ber of party members per municipality and include time x municipality
fixed effects, time x party fixed effects, municipality x party x electoral
cycle fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by municipality
and reported in parentheses. Significance ***at 1% level, **at 5%level,
*at 10%level.
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Table 1.7 DID Estimates of the effect of winning the election on Party
Membership: local elections 1996 to 2012 - cross party movements
DID DID-11 parties
(1) (2)




Time x Party FE Yes Yes
Mun. x Party FE Yes Yes
Mun. x Party x Electoral Cycle FE Yes Yes
N 6,147,596 3,513,172
R2 0.999 0.999
Notes: the table reports DID estimates based on equation 1.1 for a restricted sample
of party members. In particular, it includes only individuals that joined a party in
any period before local elections and did not leave the sample in the 12 months after
each election (that is, it excludes individuals that become non members and it does
not include those that joined a party during this time period). Controls include time x
party fixed effects, municipality x party x electoral cycle fixed effects and municipality
x time fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by the number of party members per
municipality. Robust standard errors are clustered by municipality and reported in
parentheses. Significance ***at 1% level, **at 5%level, *at 10%level.
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Appendix 1.A Supplementary tables and figures
Figure 1.A1 Histogram of Margin of Victory
Notes: the figure shows the histogram of the margin of victory in the two party electoral race.
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Figure 1.A2 Evolution of Voters and Party Members
Notes: the figure reports the evolution of voters and party members by electoral period. The
dashed vertical lines refer to local elections while the solid lines to federal and state elections.
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Figure 1.A3 Descriptive Statistics on the Five Major Brazilian Political
Parties













































































































































Notes: the figures show the monthly evolution of party membership in Brazil from Oct/92 to
Oct/14. Panel A illustrates the evolution of the stock of party members while Panel B the
inflows and outflows. Vertical dashed lines indicate the time period in which local elections
took place while solid lines indicate dates of federal and state elections.
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Notes: The table shows the number of
party members by occurrence in the data.
Table 1.A2 Number of Elections with 2 candidates by Margin of Victory
Elections Total MV≤ 0.10 % MV≤ 0.05 % MV≤ 0.02 %
1996 2,577 1,105 45.0 603 24.6 260 10.6
2000 2,887 1,090 39.5 572 20.7 237 8.6
2004 2,639 1,232 46.8 654 24.8 253 9.6
2008 2,852 1,284 44.4 711 24.6 251 8.7
2012 2,988 1,434 48.1 766 25.7 330 11.1
Notes: The table shows the number and the proportion of two candidate races in Brazil by
margin of victory of the winning candidate for each mayoral election held between 1996 and
2012.
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Table 1.A3 RD Estimates (races with two candidates) - Alternative
Specifications: local elections 1996-2012
Parametric RD Parametric RD Non Parametric RD
(1) (2) (3)





N 329,306 329,306 92,400
R2 0.981 0.981
Notes: The table shows parametric and non parametric RD estimates of the effect of
winning the local elections on the membership share of political parties for different
polynomial specifications and alternative bandwidth types. Significance ***at 1% level,
**at 5%level, *at 10%level.
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Table 1.A4 Placebo RD Estimates: local elections 1996-2012
Non Parametric RD Non Parametric RD
(1) (2)
winning party 0.196 0.285
(0.152) (0.308)
h 0.14 0.06
BW Type CCT IK
N 230,950 134,968
Notes: The table reports Placebo RD estimates of the effect of winning
the local elections on the membership share of political parties for a
window of 12 months before local elections. Significance ***at 1%
level, **at 5%level, *at 10%level.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Returns to Political Loyalty:
Evidence from the Bolsa Famı́lia
Program
2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter ascertained that individuals opportunistically join political
parties as a result of an electoral victory at the local level. This chapter combines
the data set on Brazilian party members presented in the first chapter with data
on the universe of recipients of the Bolsa Famı́lia, the largest Conditional Cash
Transfer (CCT) program in the world, to study whether members of political
parties in office are rewarded with targeted transfers. Specifically, it uses variation
from the Brazilian mayoral elections of 2008 and 2012 to explore the returns to
membership, at the local level, for the period 2005 to 2015.
There is extensive evidence that politicians distort the allocation of public re-
sources (Finan & Mazzocco (2016)). Discretionary transfers, in particular, might
be allocated to specific districts or particular geographic areas as typical forms of
pork-barrel politics (Levitt & Jr. (1997), Voigtlaender & Voth (2014), and Carozzi
& Repetto (2016)).
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There is also convincing evidence that politicians claim electoral credit for in-
come transfers targeted to particular groups of voters (Manacorda et al. (2011),
de Janvry et al. (2012), De La O (2013), Labonne (2013) and Zucco (2013)).1
Since voters respond to government policies, distortions driven by incentives to
win and retain office might leave room for electoral exchanges between politicians
and voters.
Indeed, a well-established body of literature on distributive politics discusses how
political parties (once in office) allocate targetable goods promised before elections
(Dixit & Londregan (1996)). One strand of literature follows Cox & McCubbins
(1986) in arguing that transfers should be allocated to core supporters (rather
than swing or opposing voters) given that the political preferences of this group of
voters are known. Another strand of literature contends that allocating promised
benefits to core voters might be a waste of resources, since members of this group
would not switch their vote choices (Lindbeck & Weibull (1987)). However, once
strategic interactions are taken into account, it remains unclear which group (swing
or core voters) would be targeted with promised transfers (Cox (2009)).
On one hand, the secrecy of ballots might represent an obstacle to electoral
exchanges since it restrains the ability of political machines to monitor voters’
choices. In addition, politicians might not be able to credibly commit ex ante to
particular types of ex post transfers (Robinson & Verdier (2013)). Yet, there is
evidence of clientelism and vote buying, which suggests that, in practice, agents
are able to circumvent the two-sided commitment problem (Brusco et al. (2013)
and Diaz-Cayeros et al. (forthcoming)).
It has been argued that politicians might use knowledge of voters’ social networks
to infer individual vote choices or might hire local brokers to target more reciprocal
individuals (Stokes (2005), Finan & Schechter (2012) and Larreguy et al. (2016).
1Note that while pork-barrel spending is typically associated with transfers that benefit all
constituents in a certain district or area, redistributive transfers are usually in the form of
redistributions from rich to poor voters. See also Baez et al. (2012) for a related study that
shows evidence that targeted transfers influence political participation and political views.
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Political machines might also implement alternative strategies of mobilization such
as turnout buying (Dunning & Stokes (2007) and Nichter (2008)).2
Despite this, there is scarce empirical evidence on whether individuals are re-
warded for their loyalty after casting a vote. In part this is due to the lack of
adequate micro-data linking political support to the recipiency of benefits. In-
formation on party membership at the individual level is usually private and not
publicly disclosed, since it could be used to identify and punish political adver-
saries. Moreover, ballots are secret in modern democracies to ensure privacy and
anonymity of votes.
In this respect, the paper by Hsieh et al. (2011), which documents punishments of
opponents of the former President of Venezuela Hugo Chávez is a notable excep-
tion. Combining data from unsuccessful petitions that intended to remove Chávez
from office with individual labor market outcomes, the study provides evidence
that petition signers faced lower earnings and lower employment probability than
non-signers once these lists were publicized.3 The work by Maurer (2015), that in-
vestigates whether the German National Socialist party (NSDAP) used resources
to benefit their voters after achieving a parliamentary majority in 1933, is also
closely related.4 Nonetheless, in authoritarian regimes, the ability to reward sup-
porters or punish opponents is substantially higher than in established democracies
at most times. Thus, whether and how individuals are rewarded when the party
they support assumes office remains largely unexplored.
This study attempts to contribute to this literature. In particular it examines
whether the probability of recipiency of a Bolsa Famı́lia transfer changes for party
members and non members when political parties assume or leave municipal office.
2Note that Finan & Schechter (2012) show that political machines might use local brokers
to target more reciprocal individuals either because they know individual political preferences,
and prefer to ”buy” their turnout (rather than their vote) or because reciprocity facilitates
cooperation in a repeated game.
3In particular, Hsieh et al. (2011) use information consolidated in a database called Maisanta
which contained a list of all registered voters as of March 2004 and an indicator of whether the
individual signed the last of three referenda for a recall vote against former President Chávez.
This information was later matched with labor market outcomes included in the Venezuelan
Household Survey and used for political retaliation against opponents of the Chávez regime.
4Specifically, Maurer (2015) shows that public employment increased between 1933 and 1939
in cities where the NSDAP received a higher vote share.
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The Bolsa Famı́lia is a major decentralized CCT program that was launched by
the federal government of Brazil in the end of 2003, currently covering more than
23% of the Brazilian population (or 14 million households). Although widely
advertised as a federal program, municipal governments play a central role in
the implementation of Bolsa Famı́lia: they are responsible for selecting potential
beneficiaries and for enforcing the program conditionalities. That could create
incentives for local politicians or local bureaucrats to manipulate the program in
their own favor. Indeed Brollo et al. (2017) find evidence that politicians with high
electoral incentives manipulate the enforcement of conditionalities before elections
(in particular those related to school attendance). In contrast to their work, this
study focuses on whether politicians allocate transfers among voters after elections
and notably on whether these transfers are distributed to supporters of political
parties that gained access to office.
As a motivating evidence, this chapter starts by investigating whether shifts of
party in power affect the recipiency of Bolsa Famı́lia at the municipal level. Results
indicate that the recipiency of Bolsa Famı́lia increases by 0.4% in municipalities
where a new party is in office.
In order to investigate whether these transfers are distributed to supporters of the
party in office at the local level, this work then estimates the returns to party
membership. The baseline results from the OLS regressions suggest that party
members are 0.5% more likely to receive a BF transfer when their party is in
office.
To deal with endogeneity issues from the OLS model that might bias estimates
(since membership might be driven both by changes of party in office and endoge-
nous movements in and out of political parties) and to rule out reverse causality
issues (membership causing recipiency and not the other way around), this study
proposes an instrumental variable approach. Specifically, it exploits the structure
of the data and uses the membership of an individual in a baseline period pre-
policy as an instrument for its membership in period t, which allows the variation
to come entirely from parties assuming and leaving office and not from inflows and
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outflows of members from political parties. The estimates from the IV regressions
indicate that the returns to membership is of 0.3%.
This chapter later examines whether political parties allied to the party of the
mayor are also rewarded with transfers and whether those in the opposition are
more likely to be punished (losing transfers). Surprisingly, voters linked to groups
other than the party of the elected mayor do not seem to be significantly rewarded
with transfers as a result of their party being in office. This might be a signal that
parties in office are distributing Bolsa Famı́lia transfers to core as oppose to swing
voters. In addition, there seems to be no punishment for members of parties that
competed in an election but lost the race, which could be explained by the fact
that including additional individuals in the list of recipients of BF transfers might
be less costly than removing them from the list of beneficiaries.
Finally, this study presents evidence that returns for members that join the party
just before the local elections are higher than for those that join the party far in
the past.
Overall, the evidence presented in this study seems consistent with a model where
voters and political machines interact in a dynamic context, as largely sustained in
works on vote-buying (Stokes (2005) and Finan & Schechter (2012)). An important
feature of the data on membership is that the lists of party members are publicly
available prior to elections. Thus, while politicians cannot observe individual
votes, information on political membership could be used to infer the degree of
loyalty of members or predict future vote choices. This work presents evidence that
membership prior to local elections correlates highly with the vote share a party
will receive in the election. Thus, political parties seem to be targeting individuals
that were arguably loyal when casting their vote and that are arguably more
responsive to transfers. Furthermore, since political support might be a function
of the history of exchanges between voters and the parties they support, preserving
partisan loyalties might explain how political machines deal with the commitment
problem of rewarding individuals ex post (Diaz-Cayeros et al. (forthcoming)).
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In estimating the returns to political affiliation this study closely relates to the
literature that attempts to establish the value of political connections. In partic-
ular, it relates to the works of Fafchamps & Labonne (2017) and Gagliarducci &
Manacorda (2017) that focus on returns of holding public office.5 It also relates
to works that explore whether those connections influence the allocation of road
construction contracts or investments in land improvements (Lehne et al. (2016),
Markussen & Tarp (2014)) In contrast to these studies, this chapter looks to the
allocation of targeted transfers and provide evidence that political connections
seem to be relevant when politicians distribute those resources at the local level.
This work finally contributes to the literature on the manipulation of policies near
electoral periods (Ferraz (2007), Camacho & Conover (2011) and Brollo et al.
(2017)). If targeted government policies affect voter choices, as widely docu-
mented, then politicians or bureaucrats may have high incentives to strategically
manipulate these policies.6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief
background on Brazils institutions, and Section 2.3 a description of the data used in
the analysis. Section 2.4 documents motivating evidence used for this study. The
empirical strategy to measure returns on party membership is discussed in Section
2.5 together with the paper’s main empirical findings and possible interpretations.
Section 2.6 concludes the paper.
2.2 Institutional Background
The analysis carried out in this chapter strongly relies on the institutional back-
ground introduced in chapter 1 (refer to section 1.2). In what follows I will then
5For measures of the value of political connections at the firm level see Fisman (2001) Khwaja
& Mian (2005), Faccio (2006).
6Ferraz (2007) documents that politicians influence bureaucrats to manipulate the approval
of environmental licenses for new industrial plants in urban Brazil. Camacho & Conover (2011)
establish patterns of manipulation and strategic behavior by local politicians during the imple-
mentation of the first Census of the Poor in Colombia that was used as a targeting instrument to
identify potential beneficiaries for a variety of social welfare programs in the country. Brollo et al.
(2017) highlight that politicians manipulate the degree of enforcement of the conditionalities of
the Bolsa Famı́lia program
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focus only on the main features of the Bolsa Famı́lia Program.
2.2.1 Bolsa Famı́lia Program
Bolsa Famı́lia (BF) is a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program targeted to
the poor. It was created in 2003 by the federal government of Brazil as a result
of the merging of four existing transfer programs (Vale Gás, Vale Alimentação,
Bolsa Escola and Fome Zero). It is also the largest CCT program in the world,
covering around 14 million households, or 23% of the Brazilian population.
BF is largely decentralized with each level of government playing a different and
complementary role in the program. The Federal Government, through the Min-
istry of Social and Agrarian Development (MDSA), defines the budget, targets,
eligibility criteria and conditionalities of the program. Municipal governments, in
turn, are responsible for identifying and selecting potential beneficiaries. They
are required to collect a rich set of information on poor families and include them
into a national database called Cadastro Único, with registration in the Cadastro
being a necessary condition for recipiency of a BF benefit.7 This information is
later processed by a federal bank (Caixa Econômica Federal - CEF) according to
eligibility conditions defined by the MDSA. The MDSA thus decides who is eligi-
ble to receive the benefit (according to budget availability) and allows the CEF to
provide the payments.8
Local governments are also responsible for enforcing the program’s conditionalities
(that are mainly school attendance for all school-age children in a family and
certain health checkups and vaccinations for mothers and their children). Families
that fail to comply with conditionalities might face different penalties that range
from simple warnings to the loss of the BF transfer.
In contrast to other CCTs around the world such as the Mexican Progresa or the
Colombian Familias en Acción, where the eligibility criteria depend on a composite
7The Cadastro Único was created in 2001 by the Federal Government and is the main registry
for the purpose of programs and policies directed at low-income populations in Brazil.
8Recipients withdraw their stipend using ATM electronic cards.
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score of a household’s characteristics that proxy household income, BF benefits
are granted based on self-reported income.9 Households with declared monthly per
capita income below certain thresholds qualify for the program and are entitled
to different types of benefits. The first type of benefit is a fixed amount that
follows an income criteria (basic benefit), while the second varies depending on
the demographic composition of the household (variable benefit).10 On average, a
family receives R$163.06 ($49) per month and the yearly cost of the program is
around 0.4% of the GDP (or 2.4% of federal expenditures).11
BF was not randomly implemented across the country. The MDSA first con-
structed poverty maps based on a national household survey (Pesquisa Nacional
por Amostra de Domićılios - PNAD) and the Brazilian census to estimate the
number of poor families in each municipality. It then promoted targeting with
municipal quotas that were complemented with the information on poor families
contained in the Cadastro Único.12 However, there is evidence that local quotas
are not strictly binding and in practice some municipalities have more beneficiaries
than estimated measures would suggest.13
Despite arguments that BF is a typical example of a successful programmatic
policy, recent official reports point to sizable irregularities in the program.14 For
instance, in one of the biggest attempts to scrutinize the BF program, the MDSA
audited all BF transfers given during the period between 2013 to 2016 (in a joint
work with federal prosecutors). The audits showed irregularities in more than 1
million monthly benefits (which is roughly 8% of all benefits given in a year). As a
9According to Soares et al. (2009) BF follows means test targeting that is only partially
verified since information on income provided by municipalities used is basis to assign recipiency
might be strictly self-declared and not always cross-checked with other national databases such
as the Cadastro Único itself or social security data.
10Note that following the income threshold for participating in the program families are divided
into poor and extremely poor. Extremely poor households qualify for both types of benefits and
are not subject to conditionalities. Poor families, on the other hand, can only request variable
benefits being subject to the program conditionalities.
11Information based on 2015 data.
12Note that, according to the MDSA, municipal quotas are updated throughout time.
13See Soares et al. (2009) for a discussion of the targeting process of Bolsa Famı́lia.
14See Fried (2012) or Hunter & Sugiyama (2013) for arguments of BF as a poverty program
less prone to clientelism.
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result of this work, 469 thousand families lost their benefit and other 654 thousand
had them blocked.15
Furthermore, given the decentralized structure of the BF program, local politicians
and bureaucrats might have the incentive to manipulate it in their favor. Indeed,
Brollo et al. (2017) find evidence that politicians become more lenient with the
enforcement of conditionalities (specifically those related to school attendance)
in order to influence electoral outcomes. In particular, their results show that
mayors that face higher electoral incentives (first-term mayors), and are connected




The primary data source of this study is the longitudinal micro data on Brazilian
party members described in subsection 1.3.1 of the first chapter. To measure
the returns to party membership I use data on the universe of recipients of the
Bolsa Famı́lia program, which was obtained from the MDSA. These data provides
monthly information on all BF recipients since the start of the program (January
of 2004), including names and surnames of family heads, their municipality of
residence, the amount each family receives per month, and a social identification
number that uniquely identifies each beneficiary.
Since the aim of this study is to investigate whether parties, once in power, reward
their members at the local level, the data on party membership is matched with
15The audits consisted of federal prosecutors cross-checking information of recipients with
other databases such as employment registries, electoral donations, company registrations, etc.
Most irregularities discovered were associated to actual income of beneficiaries being higher
than their (self) declared income. See www.raioxbolsafamilia.mpf.mp.br for more details on the
investigation.
16There are also studies documenting manipulation of the eligibility status with individuals
reducing their labor supply in order to participate in the program (Firpo et al. (2014)).
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the data on mayoral electoral outcomes for the elections held in 2008 and 2012,
which was presented in detail in the first chapter (refer to subsection 1.3.1).
To account for local characteristics that might be correlated both with membership
and recipiency of the Bolsa Famı́lia this study also uses a large array of auxiliary
data from different sources. Baseline characteristics of municipalities come from
the 2000 census provided by the IBGE and include the share of the population
with at least high school, share of white, share of men, illiteracy rate, share of
urban population and Gini inequality index. Time varying covariates include
administrative data from local budget from 2004 to 2015 provided by the National
Treasury (Secretaria do Tesouro). I also use data on local population, GDP, birth
rate, mortality rate, homicide rate and perinatal death rate which are also provided
by the IBGE.17 I finally use a cross-sectional dataset that describes the level of
education of party members by municipality and party for the year of 2016 also
obtained from the TSE.
2.3.2 Data Selection and Descriptive Statistics
As discussed in the previous chapter, the data on party members is longitudinal
but incomplete by construction (since political parties that disappeared over the
period are not observed in the data). Thus, the final sample of this analysis is
composed of an average of 5,553 municipalities per year (out of 5,566), excluding
electoral races that cannot be combined with membership data.
It should be noted that the unit of observation both in the data on beneficiaries
of Bolsa Famı́lia and on party members is at the individual level. However, there
is no unique information that allows us to perfectly match individuals across the
data sets. In the empirical analysis, I then construct a panel with observations
aggregated at the municipal level for each year of the period 2005 to 2015. To
17Note that rates for birth, mortality, homicide and perinatal death are measured per 100,000
inhabitants. In addition, GDP and data on local budget are deflated for 2015 prices using the
IPCA, which is a consumer price index measured by the IBGE.
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aggregate the observations at the yearly level this study uses the number of re-
cipients and members of each political party as of December for each year of the
period.
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics on averages of municipal characteristics for
variables of interest between 2005 and 2015. As shown in the table roughly 13%
of voters are recipients of Bolsa Famıilia and more than 16% are members of a
political party. In addition, approximately 2.6% of voters are members of the
party of the mayor and 4.4% are members of those parties in coalition with the
mayoral candidate’s party in an election. In contrast, members of parties that
compete for office but lost represent 6.8% of voters, on average. Finally, 2.7% of
voters are members of a party that did not compete for office at the local level.
2.4 Motivating Evidence
This chapter starts by documenting how gaining access to public office affects
the overall recipiency of Bolsa Famı́lia at the local level. As discussed in the
first chapter, winning municipal office gives political parties the access to public
resources that might be distributed to their supporters. As a first piece of evidence
on the returns to membership, one could then expect to observe a differential
change in the probability of receiving a transfer in localities that experienced a
change of party in office in comparison to those that did not. To examine if this is
the case, this study exploits variation from the 2008 and 2012 Brazilian mayoral
elections and estimates the following regression model:
bmt = α + γDmt + dm + dt + umt (2.1)
where bmt is the share of recipients of Bolsa Famı́lia among the voting population
in municipality m and year t, Dmt is a dummy that equals 1 if there is a new party
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in office in municipality m in year t and 0 otherwise, dm is a municipality fixed
effect, dt is a time fixed effect and umt an error term.
The parameter of interest, γ, measures the differential change in the probability
of recipiency and is identified through the comparison of changes in the share of
beneficiaries of Bolsa Famı́lia in municipalities that did and did not change the
party in office for each year of the period between 2005 and 2015.
Note that ex ante it is unclear which sign one should expect from point estimates
of equation (2.1). For instance, parties that remain in power might have more
political capital and a larger network than parties that just gained access to public
office, which could result in greater success in rewarding voters with targeted
transfers. On the other hand, politicians that just entered office might be very keen
to build future political support or to reward those groups that helped them get
elected in the first place. However, if Bolsa Famı́lia is a program shielded from the
influence of local politicians, as sometimes argued, then the ability of incumbents
to claim credit from the program would be limited, which could mitigate any
electoral benefit from a higher coverage of the program.
Columns (1) to (5) of Table 2.2 present estimates of equation (2.1) with each
column referring to a different specification. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the municipality level in all regressions and reported in parentheses. Additive
municipal and year dummies are included in all specifications with columns (2) to
(5) also including the interaction between year and state dummies.
Results reported in the table indicate a positive and significant change in the
probability of recipiency of the Bolsa Famı́lia in municipalities where a new party
assumed office in comparison to municipalities where the same party remained
in power. These results are also robust to the inclusion of a rich set of time
varying covariates, baseline controls based on the 2000 census interacted with
year dummies and municipality specific linear time trends. The inclusion of these
controls attempt to account for the fact that municipalities where a new party is
in office might differ in observed and unobserved time varying characteristics from
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those localities where the same party remained in power, which could then affect
the recipiency of BF transfers regardless of a change of party in power.18
Focusing on the estimate from the most saturated specification displayed in column
(5), results suggest that the probability of recipiency increases by 0.4% (from a
baseline probability of 13%) when there is a change of party in office at the local
level in comparison to when there is not.
For robustness, Figure 2.1 shows an event study examining the existence of pre-
trends in the recipiency of BF transfers as a result of changes in government at the
local level. Since municipalities might experience various changes of party in office
over time the sample of the exercise is restricted to municipalities that experienced
a unique change of party in power between 2005 and 2015. That is, observations
are dropped for localities that did not have any episode of shift in government. For
those that changed party in power more than once I include only the first event
in the sample. The model is estimated with a 3-year window before and after the
electoral years of 2008 and 2012. Point estimates are standardized to their values
in the electoral year. Overall, the Figure indicates that in localities with changes
in government recipiency increases exclusively after a new party is in office.
As a final piece of motivating evidence, this chapter looks at the relation between
membership of a political party and the votes received in an election. Although
vote choices are anonymous, membership lists are publicly available to Brazilian
political parties prior to local elections. Hence, while parties might not be able to
observe vote choices at the individual level, information on membership could be
used to infer the degree of loyalty of their members in an election or to predict
future vote choices.
Table 2.3 combines electoral results of the four mayoral elections held between
1996 and 2012, and party membership data to examine this issue. Specifically, the
table shows regressions of the lagged membership share of a given political party
18Time varying controls include the change in the real GDP per capita, number of voters (log)
birth rate, death rate, perinatal death rate, real transfers per capita (log), vote share of the
winning coalition, number of candidates that competed for office in the previous local election,
electoral turnout and percentage of valid votes.
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(for different periods before an election) on the vote share this party received in
a mayoral election. For simplicity, the sample used in this analysis is restricted
to the parties of the mayoral candidates. The unit of observation is a party in
a given municipality in a certain election, with membership share defined as the
ratio between the number of members of a certain party over the total number of
members in a municipality. Note that all regressions include time x municipality
fixed effects (that account for changes in local economic conditions or local insti-
tutions), time x party fixed effects (that control for nationwide changes in policy
preferences of political parties or scandals that affect a party at the national level)
and municipality x party fixed effects (that account for unobserved party char-
acteristics that vary with locality). Robust standard errors are clustered at the
municipal level and reported in brackets.
The point estimates presented in columns (1) to (5) indicate that membership
prior to local elections is highly correlated with future vote shares. Although the
magnitude of the estimates decreases monotonically with the lag of membership,
the observed correlation still holds if one looks to the membership of a party
almost two years before an election, as shown in column (5) of the table. Albeit
the regressions do not necessarily identify a causal effect, the results seem to
suggest that political parties would not be entirely mistaken in expecting some
loyalty from their members at the ballots. This could explain, in part, the nature
of the exchange relation between party members and political parties with parties
targeting members ex post to sustain this dynamic relationship.
2.5 Returns to Party Membership
2.5.1 Empirical Model
As argued in subsection 2.3.2 the structure of the data does not allow me to
match recipients of Bolsa Famı́lia with members of political parties. To estimate
the effect of being connected to a party in office on the recipiency of Bolsa Famı́lia,
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this study then relies on a municipal-level model, which is based on an individual-
level specification presented in the Appendix of this chapter. The aggregated
model to be estimated is as follows:19






γapmt ∗Dpmt +X ′mtη + dm + dt + umt (2.2)
where bmt is the share of recipients of Bolsa Famı́lia among the voting population
in municipality m at a given period of time t, apmt is the share of members of
party p in the same period and locality, Dpmt is a dummy variable that equates
to 1 if party p is in office and 0 otherwise, X ′mt is a vector with a set of municipal
characteristics, dm is a municipality fixed effect, dt year dummies, and umt is an
error term.
Note that this strategy is flexible since it allows each party p to have different
preferences with respect to the recipiency of the BF transfers as measured by
parameter βp. It has also the advantage of controlling for unobserved charac-
teristics of municipalities (with dm) and unobservable shocks that equally affect
municipalities at the same time (with the control dt). It finally controls for time
varying observable municipal characteristics that are likely to be correlated both
with recipiency of Bolsa Famı́lia and membership of a political party with Xmt.
The parameter γ effectively measures the change in the probability of recipiency
for a member of party p before and after party p assumes office relative to changes
in the probability of recipiency for members of other political parties and non
members over the same period. In the aggregate model this effect is identified
through changes in the share of recipients in a locality driven by changes in the
share of members of the party in office.20
19See Appendix 2.A 1 for details on the aggregation of the model from the individual level.
20As discussed in subsection 1.3.1 of the previous chapter, the micro level of the data contains
names and surnames of both party members and recipients of Bolsa Famı́lia. Potentially then,
even if party members cannot be perfectly matched with beneficiaries, the model could be esti-
mated at the the family level, linking party members and recipients through surnames, letting
different families be connected to different parties at the same time. The causal effect of interest
would then be identified through changes in the number of family members connected to a party
that assumed public office, which would, in turn, still be driven by changes of party in power
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Note, however, that in equation 2.2, the effect of membership is identified using
both variation of parties assuming and leaving office and due to inflows and out-
flows of members into and out of political parties (which might be endogenous as
discussed in the first chapter). Point estimates of γ might then be biased as a con-
sequence of this strategical movements of party members since individuals could
join (or leave) political parties just before (or after) the local elections in order
to receive rewards (or avoid punishments). Additionally, it might be difficult to
disentangle whether voters support parties as a result of being targeted or whether
they are targeted as a result of their support.
In order to shed light on the causal effect of membership on recipiency and deal
with the reverse causality mentioned, this study proposes an instrumental variable
approach using the membership in a baseline period t0 (pre-policy) as an instru-
ment for membership in t. As argued in the first chapter, the structure of the
data on party membership captures the timing of individual movements in and
out of political parties. Restricting party membership to a baseline period before
the start of the program thus allows all variation used to identify γ to come ex-
clusively from changes of party in office. Explicitly, in the aggregate model, this
identification strategy would allow the comparison of municipalities with similar
characteristics and where the same party assumed office, with the variation coming
solely from different membership shares (among voters) at baseline.
2.5.2 Baseline Results: Mayoral Candidate’s Party
Table 2.4 presents OLS and IV estimates of equation (2.2). In particular, the Table
displays results of the returns to membership in a given municipality, measured
in terms of recipiency of Bolsa Famı́lia, for the years between 2005 and 2015.21
The dependent variable is the share of beneficiaries in year t in a given munici-
pality m and the variable of interest is the share of members among voters of the
at the local level. Nonetheless, that would require the use of data on the overall distribution of
surnames in a municipality, which is not available.
21Estimates for reduced form and first-stage regressions are displayed in Table 2.A2 in the
Appendix B.
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party in government, for the same period and locality (with party in government
defined as the party of the mayoral candidate). The unit of observation is thus a
municipality in a given year. Regressions are weighted by the number of voters
in each municipality. All specifications include municipality fixed effects and year
dummies as a minimum set of controls. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the municipal level and reported in parentheses.
Overall, OLS estimates (columns 1 to 5) show that the returns to membership are
significantly positive. Note that estimates are robust to the inclusion of several
controls that range from state dummies interacted with year dummies that account
for unobservables that might vary with states over time (column 2), time varying
covariates that include the percentage of valid votes, electoral turnout, number
of candidates competing in the electoral race, vote share of the winning coalition,
amount of federal transfers, birth rate, homicide rate, death rate, perinatal death
rate, change of GDP per capita, number of voters (column 3), baseline covariates
interacted with year dummies that include literacy rate, share of white, share of
men, share of population with at least high school, Gini index, share of urban
population (column 4) and baseline membership of parties interacted with year
dummies that allows the baseline membership of each political party to follow a
different trend over time in each municipality (column 5).
Focusing on the estimated coefficient of the most saturated OLS regression pre-
sented in column (5), the estimate show that the probability that a party member
receives a transfer increases by 0.5% when his party assumes office. Reconciling
this estimate with results displayed in column (4) of Table 2.2, this would imply
that all individuals who receive a BF transfer due to changes of party in power
would be members of the party that assumed local government (that is, members
of the party of the mayor).
To deal with the fact that the OLS specification might not be able to disentangle
the causal effect of membership on recipiency and that OLS estimates might suffer
from an upward bias, columns (6) to (10) of the same table present estimates of
the IV strategy proposed in the last subsection. In all regressions the share of
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members of the party in government in year t is instrumented with its share at a
baseline year before the start of the Bolsa Famı́lia program (set at 2003). Controls
reported are the same as those used in OLS regressions (columns 1 to 5) and are
included in the same order.
Although point estimates in columns (6) to (8) are not statistically significant, all
estimated coefficients from the IV specification in columns (6) to (10) are lower
in magnitude than the OLS coefficients (columns 1 to 5), as one would expect.
Additionally, the inclusion of baseline covariates interacted with year dummies
(column 9) brings significance to estimated coefficients, which indicates that the
inclusion of further controls reduces the residual variance and gives more precision
to estimates. This is also confirmed by the most saturated specification presented
in column (10) (that has the same set of controls as the OLS model reported in
column (5) of the table). Explicitly, the point estimate presented in column (10)
indicate that the probability that a party member receives a BF transfer increases
by 0.3% when his party assumes office.
2.5.3 Party Coalitions
The structure of the electoral data provided by the TSE enables me to distinguish
all pertinent groups running for local office.22 Notably, political parties can be
grouped, according to mayoral electoral results, in the following categories: win-
ning coalition, losing coalition, and parties not running for office. This allows me
to examine how rewards are distributed within a winning coalition and whether
those identifying with the opposition are more likely to be punished (as one would
expect).
It is worth mentioning that when voting in electronic ballots in mayoral elections,
Brazilians have to type the number of the party with a candidate to cast a valid
vote. In other words, votes are not distributed among coalition allies and are
22As argued in subsection 2.3.1, Brazilian political parties usually run in coalition when com-
peting in mayoral elections.
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rather concentrated in the mayoral candidate’s party (which might imply an ex-
pression of preferences for the party with a running candidate). For this reason,
the winning and losing coalitions are further decomposed into the parties of the
mayoral candidates and those allied that also composed the coalition competing
for office (since effects might be more salient for members in the party of the mayor
or for those in parties with candidates that lost an election).
Columns (1) to (10) of Table 2.5 show OLS and IV regressions of the effect of
membership on the recipiency of BF transfers for all of those party groups. All
specifications include municipality fixed effects and year dummies as a minimum
set of controls. Regressions are weighted by the number of voters in each munici-
pality. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and showed in
brackets.
OLS estimates (columns 1 to 5) suggest that the probability that a party member
receives a transfer indeed increases when his party assumes office. However, point
estimates indicate that returns to membership are only statistically significant
for members of the party of the mayor, which indicates that parties that assume
office are not allocating transfers to the other parties of the government coalition.
Furthermore, members of the parties that competed for office but lost the election
do not seem to be punished as a result of being in the opposition. Focusing on
the specification displayed in column (5), the point estimate reported in the first
row show that members of the party of the mayor are 0.5% more likely to receive
a BF transfer than non members or members of parties that did not compete for
office in that locality.
To deal with the endogeneity and reverse causality issues mentioned in subsection
2.5.1, columns (6) to (10) of the same Table present IV estimates. In line with
point estimates of the OLS regressions, estimates of the IV specifications are not
significant for groups other than the members of the party of the mayor. Addi-
tionally, estimates loose precision when the model is fully saturated as showed in
column (10) of the table.
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Summing up, results presented so far can be interpreted as a sign of patronage
with political parties targeting individuals that are expected to be loyal when
casting their vote and are arguably more responsive to transfers. Considering that
politicians run for office multiple times in subsequent periods, and also in different
types of elections (majoritarian and proportional), this clientelistic relation could
be the result of a sustained cooperation between voters and politicians. In this
respect, note that political parties do not face term limits and can remain in
office at the local level for an indefinite period (in contrast to mayors that face a
two-term limit).
In addition, the fact that members of parties that lost the electoral race are not less
likely to receive benefits might be explained by the fact that excluding individuals
from the list of beneficiaries could be both more difficult and costly for municipal
administrations than including them in the list of beneficiaries. Finally, note that
negligible returns to members of other parties in the winning coalition that not the
party of the mayor could be interpreted as sign that parties in office are targeting
core in oppose to swing voters.
2.5.4 Robustness Checks
The validity of the research design relies on the assumption that members of a
given party do not predict their party’s electoral victory and therefore returns to
membership are not anticipated. That is, the membership of a particular party
only affects the local recipiency of Bolsa Famı́lia once this party assumes public
office. I then perform an event study analysis of the effect of membership on the
recipiency of Bolsa Famı́lia to investigate the existence of pre-trends on returns to
membership. To perform this exercise, the sample is restricted to a single event
per municipality with an event being defined as a locality having experienced a
change of party in power between 2005 and 2015. Localities that did not change
the party in power within this period are excluded from the sample. The model
described below is built with a time window of three years around 2008 and 2012,
which are the years where mayoral elections take place. Estimated coefficients are
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measured relative to the electoral periods, which are the first year prior an entry
in government and hence omitted. In formulas,
bmt = α +
3∑
k=−3
γkamtF ∗Dk +X ′mtη + dm + dt + umt (2.3)
Note that amtF is the share of voters affiliated to the party in government in tF
for each municipality m, where tF is equal to the first year after a change of party
in power. Controls are the same as those included in (2.2).
Figure 2.2 graphically illustrates this event study analysis. Estimated coefficients
are displayed in the figure with 95 percent confidence intervals.23 For a given
municipality, the dashed vertical line refers to 2008 or 2012 (the electoral years).
The figure shows that point estimates are nearly zero before an electoral year,
which suggests no pre-trends on the returns to membership prior to a party assum-
ing office. Moreover, there is a change in the gradient of the estimated coefficient
precisely when a new party assumes government, which indicates that the effect of
entry is significantly positive (that is, members of the party of the mayor are only
rewarded when their party assumes office and not before), alleviating concerns
with the validity of the proposed identification strategy.
Another possible concern with the regression model presented in equation (2.2)
is that there might still be omitted variables correlated both with membership
and recipiency that would confound the estimates. One major issue is that the
estimated effect might be the result of parties rewarding voters rather than party
members.
I try to address this issue including the vote share of each party competing for
local office as an additional control in the most saturated OLS and IV specifications
displayed in Table 2.4. Note that the vote share of those parties that are registered
in a municipality but did not compete for office is set as equal to zero.
23Point estimates are depicted in column (2) of Table 2.A1 included in the Appendix 2.A 2.
For transparency, results following different specifications of equation 3.3 are also reported in
the Table.
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Table 2.A3 present OLS and IV regressions of the effect of membership on the
recipiency of BF with this additional control. Reassuringly, estimates of OLS
and IV presented columns 1 and 3, respectively, are significant and very close in
magnitude to estimates presented in columns (4) and (9) of Table 2.4, suggesting
that these concerns are of second order.
2.5.5 Heterogeneous Effects
EDUCATION OF PARTY MEMBERS. Given that BF transfers are targeted to
the poor, one could expect the returns to membership to be more salient to those
members that are in the lower tail of the income distribution. As an attempt to
examine this issue, this study uses a cross-sectional data on the level of education
of party members for the year 2016.
These data detail the number of members per party and municipality in 8 differ-
ent education categories (illiterate, literate, incomplete primary, complete primary,
incomplete secondary, complete secondary, incomplete tertiary, and complete ter-
tiary) as of December 2016, which enables us to compute the proportion of mem-
bers of party p in one of these 8 k education categories in a given locality. Relying
on the assumption that this proportion is time invariant, I then reconstruct the
membership level of parties by education category and municipality for the base-
line year 2003.
Columns (1) to (5) of Table 2.6 show results of IV regressions of this heterogeneous
effect. The model estimated follows closely (2.2) with the difference that the
independent variable of interest (the share of members of the party in office) is
disaggregated in those 8 education categories. Explicitly, each education category
is defined as the proportion of members of the party in government among voters,
measured as of 2003. All specifications include municipality fixed effects, year
dummies and the baseline education of party members interacted with year fixed
effects.
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Results are presented in Table 2.6 and reveal that returns to membership are con-
centrated on literate individuals (defined as those with no schooling but able to
read or write), which indicates that BF transfers are more likely to be distributed
to those party members that are likely candidates to receive a Bolsa Famı́lia trans-
fer rather to those in the middle and upper tail of the income distribution.
MARGIN OF VICTORY. The empirical findings have shown so far that mem-
bers of a party that assumed office at the local level are significantly more likely to
receive BF transfers. Nonetheless, it is still an open question whether parties that
won an election with a large margin of victory (and therefore might have more
political capital) are more able to reward members than those that won a close
electoral race.
To address this issue, this chapter compares the returns to membership in close
and safe electoral races. Given that Brazil has a multi-party system, to simplify
the interpretation of results, sample used in this analysis is restricted to electoral
races with only two candidates (or coalitions), which excludes roughly 50% of the
observations used in the original sample. In practice, the variable of interest in
equation (2.2) (the share of members of the party in office) is interacted with sev-
eral dummies that group municipalities according to different margins of victory.
Note that for races with two candidates the margin of victory is explicitly mea-
sured as the vote share of the winning candidate minus the vote share of the losing
candidate.
Table 2.7 presents point estimates of IV regressions of the returns to membership
by the margin of victory of the winning party.24 Focusing on the specification
reported in column (5) of the table, one can see a clear gradient across estimates.
As illustrated in the first and second rows of column (5), returns to party mem-
bership seem to be considerably higher in localities where parties that won office
were elected with a vote share higher than 55% (in comparison to localities where
parties won tight races). Notably, there also seem to be significant returns to party
24For transparency, Table 2.A4 displayed in the Appendix 2.A 2 reports estimates of (2.2) for
the restricted sample. Estimates are overall robust and in line with those presented in Table 2.4
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membership in municipalities where mayors were elected in competitive elections,
as can be seen in the third and fourth rows of column (5), which alleviate concerns
that the estimated effect presented presented in Table 2.4 is driven by differential
trends in unobservable characteristics of municipalities that are not accounted for
in the main specification.
TIMING OF MEMBERSHIP. Causal estimates presented so far focused on
members that joined a political party before 2004. However, returns to member-
ship might be more salient to recent members than to those than joined the party
far in the past. Additionally, the instrument proposed in subsection 2.5.2, that
used membership shares based on a fixed year (set as 2003), cannot fully account
for endogenous movements of party members (given that there is no variation in
membership of parties that were registered in a municipality but did not compete
for office in a certain electoral cycle).
Estimates presented in Table 2.A5 take these issues into consideration. Columns
(1) to (4) of the Table report estimates of different IV regressions based on equation
(2.2) with each column of the Table using the same set of controls but a different
set of instruments that attempt to account for the endogeneity of membership.
Column (1) simply replicates the point estimate presented in column (9) of Table
2.4. As argued in subsection 2.5.2, this specification instruments the share of
members of the party in government in t with its share in the baseline year 2003
(pre-policy). Column (2) to (4), in turn, present instrumented regressions based
on membership shares of the party in government for the periods of 1 year, 6
months and 3 months before local elections, respectively. As discussed above,
the IV specifications presented in columns (2) to (4) additionally instrument the
actual membership share of the political parties that did not compete for office in
an election.
The analysis of columns (1) to (4) of the table suggest that the magnitude of
estimates is significantly higher when the instrument is based on more recent
members rather than on older members. In particular, the point estimate of
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column (4) is 1.1 percentage points higher than the one presented in column (1),
which indicates that members of the party of the mayor that joined the party just
before elections seem to derive slightly higher returns than those members that
join the party far in the past.
2.6 Conclusion
This study employed a micro longitudinal data on Brazilian party members and
data on the universe of recipients of the Bolsa Famı́lia program to examine whether
voters are rewarded for their loyalty after casting their vote. First, it documents
that voters are more likely to receive Bolsa Famı́lia in municipalities with a new
party in power, which could be a signal that political parties that are successful
in the elections might be allocating resources towards its supporters.
In this direction, the results of this chapter show that the observed effect on
recipiency is mostly explained by an increase in the probability that members of the
party of the mayor receive a BF transfer. In addition, returns to membership are
concentrated on individuals with no schooling, which suggests that BF transfers
are more likely to be distributed to party members that are likely candidates to
receive the CCT transfer.
In contrast, members of parties that are in the opposition are not less likely to
receive the BF transfers, which indicates that parties that gained access to office
might be targeting solely their own supporters or might be too costly to penalize
adversaries.
The evidence presented in this study seems consistent with vote-buying models
with repeated interactions between political parties and voters. It additionally
provides direct evidence of material rewards to party membership.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 2.1 Event study of trends in the recipiency of BF driven by shifts of
party in office: 2005-2015
Notes: the figure shows an event study of trends in the recipiency of Bolsa Famıilia that are
result of changes of party in office at the local level. The sample is restricted to a single event
per locality during the period between 2005 and 2015, with an event defined as a change of
party in power. The model is estimated with a 3-year window around the electoral years of 2008
and 2012 with point estimates standardized to their values in the electoral year. For reference,
see section 2.4.
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Figure 2.2 Event study of trends in returns to party membership: 2005-2015
Notes: the figure shows an event study of pre-trends in the recipiency of Bolsa Famı́lia as a
result of changes in membership caused by parties assuming and leaving office in municipalities.
The sample is restricted to a single event per locality during the period between 2005 and
2015, with an event defined as a change of party in power. The model is estimated with a
3-year window around the electoral years of 2008 and 2012 with point estimates standardized
to their values in the electoral year. Estimated coefficients presented in the Figure are based on
regressions illustrated in column (2) of Table 2.A1. See section 2.5.4 for reference.
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Municipal Characteristics: 2005-2015
Mean Std Dev.
% of beneficiaries 0.133 0.072
% of party members 0.165 0.077
% of members in the party of the mayor 0.026 0.030
% of members in party’s allied to the mayor 0.044 0.037
% of members in parties that lost an election 0.068 0.045
% of members in parties that did not run 0.027 0.029
N 60,764
Notes: the table reports descriptive statistics on averages of municipal characteristics for the
variables of interest in the empirical analysis for the years between 2005 and 2015. Variables
presented in each row of the table are reported as share of voters. The table shows the share
of recipients of Bolsa Famıilia, party members, party members affiliated with the party of
mayor, party members of parties in coalition with the party of the mayor, party members
affiliated to parties that lost an election and party members affiliated to parties that did not
compete for local office.
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Table 2.6 Heterogeneous effect of being connected to a party in office on the
recipiency of BF by level of education of party members: 2005 to 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dep. var.: share of beneficiaries
illiterate -0.102 -0.137 -0.082 -0.143 -0.143
(0.199) (0.180) (0.175) (0.168) (0.169)
literate 0.098* 0.095* 0.076 0.087* 0.087*
(0.055) (0.051) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048)
incomplete primary -0.030 -0.029 -0.022 -0.024 -0.024
(0.046) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
complete primary 0.435* 0.347* 0.285 0.205 0.205
(0.233) (0.210) (0.206) (0.206) (0.206)
incomplete secondary -0.349*** -0.301** -0.249** -0.161 -0.161
(0.135) (0.122) (0.118) (0.115) (0.115)
complete secondary -0.184 -0.135 -0.146 -0.192 -0.192
(0.143) (0.129) (0.127) (0.126) (0.126)
incomplete tertiary 0.027 0.212 0.117 0.200 0.200
(0.474) (0.426) (0.415) (0.412) (0.414)
complete tertiary 0.045 0.025 0.069 0.148 0.148
(0.207) (0.185) (0.183) (0.184) (0.185)
N 61,055 61,055 61,052 61,052 61,052
F 10.32 9.97 16.41 16.09 15.99
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Educ. of Members x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year x State FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls x Year FE No No No Yes Yes
Baseline Membership x Year FE No No No No Yes
Notes: Columns (1) to (5) of the table show estimates of the effect of being connected to a party in
office on the share of recipients of Bolsa Famı́lia for the period 2005 to 2015. Regressions follow the
model described by equation (2.2) with the difference that the variable of interest is disaggregated
in eight education categories. Each category is defined as the proportion of members of the party
in government among voters (all measured at the baseline year of 2003). Time varying municipal
controls include the real gdp per capita (log), number of voters (log), birth rate, death rate, homicide
rate, real transfers (log), vote share of the winner, number of coalitions competing the election,
electoral turnout and percentage of valid votes. Pre-treatment local covariates (interacted with year
dummies) are the same as those used in Table 2.4. Baseline membership is defined as before and
also interacted with year dummies. Party members baseline education is defined as the share of
members in each party per education category in a certain municipality and it is also interacted with
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by municipality and reported in parentheses.
Significance *** at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level.
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Table 2.7 Heterogeneous effect of being connected to a party in office on the
recipiency of BF benefits in races of two candidates by margin of victory:
2005-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dep. var.: share of beneficiaries
share of gov*[MV > 0.20] 0.136 0.102*** 0.099*** 0.119*** 0.107***
(0.089) (0.036) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031)
share of gov*[0.20 ≥MV > 0.10] 0.223* 0.151*** 0.127*** 0.115*** 0.101***
(0.134) (0.055) (0.045) (0.035) (0.032)
share of gov*[0.10 ≥MV > 0.05] 0.172* 0.057* 0.061** 0.075*** 0.070***
(0.088) (0.033) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026)
share of gov*[MV ≤ 0.05] 0.140* 0.063* 0.053* 0.051** 0.046**
(0.081) (0.033) (0.028) (0.023) (0.023)
N 31,035 31,035 31,035 31,035 31,035
F 8.42 7.43 8.61 9.21 8.46
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year x State FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls x Year FE No No No Yes Yes
Baseline Membership x Year FE No No No No Yes
Notes: Columns (1) to (5) of the table report estimates of the heterogeneous effect of
being connected to a party that assume office on the share of recipients of Bolsa Famı́lia
for the period 2005 to 2015, at the municipal level. The estimated model follows (2.2) but
the variable of interest is interacted with 4 dummies of the margin of victory of parties
that won the previous election and therefore are in office. The sample is restricted to
races of two candidates (or two coalitions). Controls follow those presented in 2.4. Robust
standard errors are clustered by municipality and reported in parentheses. Significance
*** at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level.
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Appendix 2.A 1 Empirical Model
At the individual level the econometric model is described by the following equa-
tion:
Bipmt = α + βpAipmt + ηDpmt + γAipmt ∗Dpmt + uipmt (2.4)
where Bipmt is a variable equal to 1 if individual i is a recipient of Bolsa Famı́lia
in municipality m and time t, Aipmt is a variable that equals 1 if individual i is
a member of party p in municipality m and time t, Dpmt is a dummy variable
that is equal to 1 if party p is in office in the same locality and time period and 0
otherwise, and uipmt an error term.
At the municipal level:
Bmt = Nmtα + βp
P∑
p=1
Apmt + ηNmt + γ
P∑
p=1
Apmt ∗Dpmt +Nmt ∗ umt (2.5)
where Bmt is the number recipients of Bolsa Famı́lia in locality m and time t,
Nmt is the total number of individuals in municipality m and time t, Apmt is the
number of party members from party p in the same locality and time period, dt
time fixed effects, and umt an error term.
Dividing (5) by Nmt, which is defined as the voting population in municipality m
and year t:
bmt = α + βp
P∑
p=1
apmt + dt + γ
P∑
p=1
apmt ∗Dpmt + emt (2.6)
where bmt is the share of individuals receiving benefits among the voters in year t
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and locality m, apmt is the of members of party p among the voters in the same
locality and year, dt year dummies, Dpmt is defined as above, and emt an error
term.
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Appendix 2.A 2 Supplementary tables and figures




[3 years before]*share of gov members -0.023 -0.000 0.002
(0.028) (0.015) (0.014)
[2 years before]*share of gov members -0.008 0.004 -0.001
(0.016) (0.013) (0.012)
[1 year before]*share of gov members -0.010 -0.002 -0.002
(0.011) (0.008) (0.007)
[Electoral Year]*share of gov members - - -
[1 year after]*share of gov members 0.018 0.010 0.002
(0.017) (0.012) (0.011)
[2 years after]*share of gov members 0.048* 0.026* 0.014
(0.028) (0.017) (0.013)
[3 years after]*share of gov members 0.066** 0.041** 0.025*
(0.047) (0.016) (0.020)
N 34,733 34,729 34,729
F 2.40 1.77 1.01
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Membership x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Year x State FE No Yes Yes
Baseline Controls x Time FE No No Yes
Notes: Columns (1) to (3) of the table present estimates of an event study that investigates
the pre-trends in returns to party membership. The model estimated is based on equation (2.2)
and uses a three year window around the electoral years of 2008 and 2012. Point estimates are
standardized to their value in the electoral years. The sample is restricted to a unique event per
municipality. That is, municipalities that did not experience a change of party between 2005 and
2015 are excluded from the analysis. In addition, for localities that faced more than one shift of
party in government during the same period I only include the first event in the sample. Robust
standard errors are clustered by municipality and reported in parentheses. Significance *** at 1%
level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level.
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Table 2.A3 Robustness Checks: effect of being connected to a party in office
on the recipiency of BF benefits controlling for the vote share: 2005-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dep. var.: share of beneficiaries OLS OLS IV IV
share of gov members 0.062*** 0.053*** 0.048** 0.031
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
N 61,052 61,052 61,052 61,052
F 7.86 7.23 7.83 7.21
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year x State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Membership x Year FE No Yes No Yes
Coalition’s Vote Share Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: the Columns (1) to (4) of the table show estimates of the effect of being a member
of a party that won office on the share of recipients of Bolsa Famı́lia at the municipal level
for the period 2005 to 2015. In IV regressions the share of members of a party that gained
access to office in t is instrumented by the share of members of the same party in a baseline
period t0 (pre-policy), which is set as 2003. All regressions are weighted by the number
of voters per municipality. For details on time varying municipal controls, pre-treatment
local covariates and baseline membership of each party see Table X. A coalition’s vote
share is defined as the vote share of each party participating in an election. The vote
share of those that did not run is set to zero. Robust standard errors are clustered by
municipality and reported in parentheses. Significance *** at 1% level, ** at 5% level, *
at 10% level.
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Table 2.A4 Effect of being connected to a party in office on the recipiency of
BF benefits in races with two candidates: 2005 to 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dep. var.: share of beneficiaries IV IV IV IV IV
share of gov members 0.101 0.056** 0.042* 0.063*** 0.048**
(0.063) (0.027) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
N 31,035 31,035 31,035 31,035 31,035
F 8.98 7.93 9.10 9.54 8.81
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year x State FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls x Year FE No No Yes Yes
Baseline Membership x Year FE No No No No Yes
Notes: the table presents IV estimates of the effect of being member of a party that
won office on the share of recipients of Bolsa Famı́lia at the municipal level for the
period 2005 to 2015. The sample is restricted to races with only two candidates (or
two coalitions). The share of members of a party that gained access to office in t
is instrumented by the share of members of the same party in a baseline period t0
(pre-policy), which is set as 2003. All regressions are weighted by the number of
voters per municipality. Time varying municipal controls include the change of the
real GDP per capita, number of voters (log), birth rate, death rate, homicide rate,
perinatal death rate, real transfers (log), vote share of the winner, number of coalitions
competing the election, electoral turnout and percentage of valid votes. Pre-treatment
local covariates (interacted with year dummies) are based on the 2000 Brazilian census
and include the share of the population with at least high school education, share of
white, share of men, illiteracy rate, share of urban population, and local Gini Index.
Baseline membership (interacted with time dummies) is defined as the share of voters
affiliated to each political party at the baseline year 2003 (at the municipal level).
Robust standard errors are clustered by municipality and reported in parentheses.
Significance *** at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Wage Transparency in Brazil
3.1 Introduction
This chapter uses data on the universe of Brazilian public sector employees from
2003 to 2015 and variation from a wage transparency policy implemented at the
state level to shed light on the effects of transparency in wages inequality in the
public sector.
The main idea behind transparency policies is that the access to publicly avail-
able information on government activities, institutions and policies enable voters
to hold public officials accountable for their performance (Persson & Tabellini
(2000), Besley & Burgess (2002) and Abrahams et al. (2016)). Public disclosure
of information might also improve governance since better informed citizens can
demand effectiveness in the delivery of public goods and services (Pande (2011),
Olken & Pande (2012), Kosack & Fung (2014)).
Indeed there is documented evidence that voters respond to disclosure of informa-
tion on actions of those in government, for instance, disciplining incumbent politi-
cians that misbehaved in office (Ferraz & Finan (2008), Banerjee et al. (2011) and
Bobonis et al. (2016)). Empirical studies also suggest that politicians respond
to better informed citizens and that new information affects governance (Ferraz
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& Finan (2011) and Banerjee et al. (2016)). There is also evidence that the dis-
closure of information on politicians is correlated with measures of the quality of
governments (Djankov et al. (2010)).
There is less evidence, however, on the effects of wage transparency policies in the
public sector. In part, this is explained by the fact that salaries in the public sector
tend to be based on a rigid pay structure with little dispersion relative to their
counterparts in the private sector, even if civil servants enjoy a substantial wage
premium when compared to private sector workers (Finan et al. (2017)). Ad-
ditionally, pay transparency policies are controversial, since disclosure of salaries
by name could undermine individual privacy, and are not widely adopted across
the world. Recent studies have also documented unintended effects of wage trans-
parency, such as the decline in job and pay satisfaction among workers with earn-
ings below the median and increase in the well-being gap between rich and poor
(Card et al. (2012) and Perez-Truglia (2016)).1 As a result, individual level data
on public sector earnings is typically not available.
This paper aims to provide evidence on the impact of pay transparency on earn-
ings inequality in the public sector. Following a law that mandated disclosure
of salaries, in June of 2012 the central government of Brazil published individual
level wages of all its employees on a transparency website. Although the law man-
dated wage disclosure exclusively for public employees working for the executive
branch of the federal government, evidence suggests that the executive power of
states and local governments followed the central government and also adopted
pay transparency policies in different points in time.
To estimate the effect of disclosure on wages inequality of civil servants I then
use variation from the timing state governments of Brazil posted salaries online
1In particular, employing a survey on a random sample of faculty and staff members of the
University of California that had their salaries published online after a court decision, Card et al.
(2012) documented that individuals with wages below the median reported lower job and pay
satisfaction and were more likely to search for a new job after comparing their earnings with
their peers. Perez-Truglia (2016) shows that income transparency significantly affected the well-
being of individuals in Norway. Specifically, online disclosure of tax records data increased the
well-being gap between rich and poor Norwegians as a result of self-image concerns, driven by
changes in self-perceived income rankings.
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together with administrative data on public sector pay from a matched employer-
employee database. These data provide universal coverage of the Brazilian public
sector for each year of the period between 2003 to 2015 and in particular detail,
for every public employee, the occupation and the average monthly wage over the
employment spell during the year. This helps to overcome the fact that wages
posted online by state administrations are not displayed in a single repository and
typically do not contain pre-disclosure information. Additionally, although I do
not have information that allows tracking individuals over time or across multiple
employers, I use the fact that state employees work in offices located in different
localities within a state with the detailed information on occupation from the
data to perform aggregate analysis both at the municipal and occupational level.
Focusing on state rather than federal level employees also allows me to separate
the effect of disclosure from a time trend. Finally, each state government has
administrative autonomy to set pay scales and define salaries of public employees
working at the state level.
Overall, this study documents that disclosure of wages significantly reduced wage
dispersion of state level employees, with effects concentrated in the upper tail of
the log earnings distribution. On average, the 90/50 wage gap of public servants
fell by 8.3 percentage points in states that adopted pay transparency in comparison
to those that did not. There is no evidence that decile gaps below the fifth decile
were differentially affected by the policy.
Note that the adoption of wage transparency policies was not randomly imple-
mented by state administrations. Thus, municipalities located in states that did
not adopt the policy might not represent a valid control group to those in states
that did adopt pay transparency. To address this concern and to control for unob-
served characteristics of states that might vary over time and could be correlated
with the adoption of transparency, I propose a triple-differences design that com-
pares localities within states. Specifically, this strategy compares municipalities
with high and low baseline levels of wage inequality (measured in the pre-disclosure
period) in states that did and did not disclose information on pay of civil servants
at the individual level. The evidence presented indicates that wages compressed
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within states as a result of pay transparency. In particular, the average 90/50 earn-
ings gap of public employees decreased by 2.2 percentage points if one considers a
baseline difference of 10 percentage points in the wage dispersion of municipalities
with high and low levels of inequality.
In estimating the impact of pay disclosure on the wage structure of the public sec-
tor this work is closely related to Mas (2017) who provides evidence that mandated
wage disclosure of municipal employees of California reduced pay compensation
of city managers. It also relates to Mas (2016) that investigates how mandated
disclosure of earnings affected CEOs compensation. 2 Consistent with his findings
this paper shows that the effect of disclosure is more salient for top earners in the
public sector. In contrast to his work, however, this study does not focus on a
particular geographical area within a country and also examines whether trans-
parency affected other parts of the public sector log earnings distribution (rather
than the highest paid job). It additionally provides evidence on the occupations
that were mostly affected by the adoption of pay transparency policies within a
state.
When analyzing the effects of transparency on earnings inequality this study also
relates to the literature on causes and consequences of income inequality (Lee
(1999), Autor et al. (2008), Bosch & Manacorda (2010) and Autor et al. (2016)).
And in particular to the strand of this literature that examines how occupations
contribute to changes in the wage structure (Firpo et al. (2011) and Fortin &
Lemieux (2016)). This paper provides evidence that the observed reduction in the
gap between top deciles in comparison to the median is driven by lower returns
to top paid jobs in the public sector rather than by changes in the composition of
top paid occupations.
2Specifically, Mas (2017) uses variation from a law that mandated disclosure of pay compen-
sation of municipal employees in California and compares early adopters (cities that disclosed
salaries previous to the mandate) to late adopters (cities that disclosed salaries only after the
mandate). The study shows that disclosure compressed wages of city managers (in particular
in cities where salaries were initially higher) and that this effect was driven by public aversion
to high salaries (rather than accountability mechanisms). In turn, Mas (2016) presents evidence
that rather than compressing average earnings of CEOs as intended, the policy seemed to have
reduced the gap between lower and higher paid CEOs.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief
description of Brazil’s institutions that are of interest in this analysis. Section 3.3
describes the data and Section 3.4 presents basic descriptive statistics. Section
3.5 discusses the identification strategy and Section 3.6 describes the paper’s main
empirical findings. Finally, Section 3.7 summarizes and concludes the paper.
3.2 Institutional Setting
3.2.1 Structure of Government and Electoral System
Brazil is a Federal Presidential Republic which is largely decentralized. The coun-
try has three autonomous levels of government with equal status as guaranteed
by the constitution. Municipalities are the lowest administrative level and are
managed by an elected mayor (chief of the executive local branch) and a local city
council. The federal district and each of the 26 Brazilian states are administered
by an elected governor and a state chamber.3 The federal government, which is the
highest level, is headed by an elected president and a national congress (comprised
by a lower house and a senate).
Each level of government is composed of three independent branches of power:
the executive, legislative and judicial.4 Across those three separate institutional
layers, the executive branch has the main responsibility for the provision of public
goods and services in the country (such as health, security or educational services).
The Brazilian constitution also determines which activities are to be exclusively
performed or regulated by each level of government and those in which responsibil-
ities are shared. For instance, the executive power of states and local governments
3Note that the federal district, where Braśılia (the capital of the country) is located, is
administered by an elected governor and a district chamber (which functions both as a state
chamber and a city council).
4An exception is the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministério Publico) that is an autonomous
institution not subordinated to any of the three branches of power of the Brazilian government.
Furthermore, the judicial branch is organized in states and at the federal level and municipalities
holds no judicial powers.
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share responsibilities regarding the provision of education as well as health care ser-
vices. In particular, municipalities are mainly responsible for early childhood and
primary education programs while the provision of secondary education is shared
by states and local governments. Services such as urban planning, public lighting,
garbage collection and public transportation, however, are mostly municipal re-
sponsibilities. In turn, police institutions responsible for providing public security
are mainly part of the executive branch of either federal or state governments.5
Elections in Brazil take place every four years on the same date throughout the
country with local elections occurring in year t and state and federal elections in
year t+2 (that is, elections are perfectly staggered by two years). Executive chiefs
of all levels of government compete for a four year-term and can remain in office for
no more than two consecutive terms. Governors of Brazilian states and the presi-
dent of the republic are elected by a plurality rule (runoff voting). Mayors, in turn,
are elected by a simple majority rule in cities with less than 200,000 voters and by
a plurality rule in those with more than 200,000 voters.6 Legislators are elected for
a four year-term with no term limits, under a proportional representation system
with an open-list.7
3.2.2 Transparency in Brazil
The basis for the adoption of transparency laws in Brazil dates back to 1988 when
the first Brazilian constitution was promulgated after the military regime. The
1988 constitution established publicity of information and administrative actions
5Police institutions at the federal level are the Federal Police, Federal Highway Police and
Federal Railway Police. The Military Police, Fire Brigade and the Civil Police are under the
control state government authorities. Note also that municipal authorities have the power to
create municipal guards. City guards, however, are mainly responsible for protecting municipal
parks, properties, installations and the interior of municipal councils and city halls and not
citizens as police institutions at the state and federal level.
6If no candidate attains an absolute majority in the first round, a runoff shall be held gathering
the two candidates with the highest number of votes (top two candidates), and the candidate
who wins the majority of valid votes (50 percent plus at least one vote) shall be considered
elected.
7Note that members of the senate are elected by a majority rule for a term of eight years and
not four as all other elected officials throughout the country.
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as primary citizens’ rights.8 As a result, several laws and initiatives followed with
the aim of promoting government openness across the country. An early example
was the law on fiscal responsibility passed in May 2000 which mandated disclosure
of key budget documents and established guidelines on transparency, control and
oversight of public finances for all three levels of government in Brazil.9
In May 2003, taking a further step to enhance transparency, the federal government
created the Federal Office of Comptroller General (Controladoria Geral da União
- CGU). The CGU was created as an anti-corruption agency that centralized
all internal control activities within the federal executive branch, also being in
charge of strengthening transparency and fighting corruption within the public
sector. The agency was also responsible for coordinating ombudsman activities
and promoting public audits of federal funds.
In November 2004, less than two years after its creation, the CGU launched a
transparency portal with the objective of ensuring real-time free access of infor-
mation on budget execution of federal funds. The portal was created as an online
tool that enabled citizens to track and monitor revenues and expenditures of the
federal government. As a direct spillover, in May of 2009 the Brazilian president
sent a bill to the national congress mandating online publishing of comprehensive
budgetary information (in real-time) to all levels of government.10
To finally regulate the constitutional principle that entitled citizens to the right
to access public information, in November 2011, the central government passed
8In particular, the article 5 of the Brazilian constitution in its subsection XXXIII states that
“all persons have the right to receive, from the public agencies, information of private interest
to such persons, or of collective or general interest, which shall be provided within the period
established by law, subject to liability, except for the information whose secrecy is essential to
the security of society and of the State.”
9The law of fiscal responsibility was also the result of a fiscal crisis that exposed massive
deficits associated with excessive spending, and over borrowing in subnational government bud-
gets across the Brazil and led to a federal bailout of subnational debt.
10The bill, known as transparency law, was approved in May 2010 by the national congress.
Compliance with the law was staggered and based on demographic characteristics of federal
entities. States, the federal district and municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants
were given one year to comply with the law. Municipalities with between 50,000 and 100,000
inhabitants were given two years, and those with less than 50,000 inhabitants were given 4 years.
In case of non-compliance the federal government can withhold voluntary intergovernmental
transfers.
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a federal bill in congress known as Lei de Acesso à Informação (LAI). The law
established a legal framework of guidelines for opening data from all levels of
government (federal, state and municipal) and branches of power (executive, leg-
islative and judiciary). Similar to a Freedom of Information Act (FOI), the law
guarantees any person the right to request non confidential information kept by
Brazilian public bodies. Non-compliance with the law might result in penalties
that range from fines to loss of mandate (for those holding public office). The aim
was also to promote active transparency in the public sector establishing mini-
mum levels of information that should be publicly available to citizens, preferably
in online transparency portals.11
The LAI was regulated in May 2012 and among other features mandated disclo-
sure of wages of all civil servants working at the executive branch of the federal
government (that is, judiciary and legislative powers at the federal level were not
obliged to disclose salaries of their workers). Although other public bodies of
Brazil were not mandated to release individual information on pay, there is evi-
dence that the executive branch of states and municipalities followed the central
government and also adopted wage transparency policies. For instance, according
to a ranking created by the federal public prosecutor’s office (Ministério Público
Federal - MPF) roughly 88% of Brazilian states (22 out of 26 states) and 29% of
municipal governments (1,605 out of 5,568 municipalities) disclosed pay of their
bureaucracy at the individual level as of 2016.12
Following LAI’s regulation, the central government of Brazil posted salaries on-
line by name of employee in June 2012. Anedoctal evidence suggests that wage
disclosure was considered a sensitive issue by trade unions and public servants
with several legal actions placed against government bodies that disclosed data
11According to Law 12,527/2011, the transparency portals should contain at least: a) a record
of competence and organizational structure, addresses and telephone numbers of the respective
units and working hours for the public; b) records of any passing or transfers of financial resources;
c) records of expenses; d) information concerning bidding procedures, including the respective
notices and results, as well as all contracts; e) general data for the monitoring of programs,
actions, projects and works of agencies and entities; and f) answers to frequently asked questions
from society. Municipalities with less than 10,000 inhabitants are not required to publish this
information in electronic portals but are still subject to the law that mandates online disclosure
of detailed information on budget execution in real-time.
12For the ranking elaborated by the MPF see: http://combateacorrupcao.mpf.mp.br/ranking.
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on pay at the individual level.13 On the other hand, there is also evidence that
exposing privileged public employees revealed the wide disparity in wages within
the Brazilian public bureaucracy.14
3.3 Data
As discussed in the previous section, the Brazilian FOI Act mandated disclosure on
pay of public employees of the central government in May 2012 with salaries being
posted online in the following month. Thus, public servants of the executive branch
of the federal government were equally affected by the law in the same period
of time across the country, which makes it impossible to separate the effect of
transparency on pay of these employees from a time trend. In order to investigate
the effects of wage disclosure in the public sector this study uses the fact that
state governments followed the central government and passively adopted pay
transparency in different time periods and focuses then on civil servants working
at the executive power of state administrations.
To perform this analysis, I first collected data on the exact date the executive
branch of each Brazilian state disclosed information on wages of their civil ser-
vants at the individual level. These data was collected mainly through public
online requests made to each state using the guidelines of the LAI. To check if
the information on the timing of disclosure provided by the state governments
matched with its availability to the general public this study also relied on other
sources such as regional or local newspapers.
Data on pay available in transparency websites of executive governments typically
contain information on the name of employees, their salary, position and office.
Importantly, data provided is not standardized across public sector bodies and
there is no single repository of data. Figure 3.1 illustrates how these data is
13For evidence: http://www.brasil.gov.br/governo/2012/07/portal-da-transparencia-volta-a-
divulgar-remuneracao-dos-servidores-do-executivo-federal.
14For instance: http://www.economist.com/node/21556916 or nytimes.com/brazil-seethes-
over-public-officials-super-salaries.
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displayed to citizens on the webpages of two state governments of Brazil. The
top figure shows data for the state of Amapá and the bottom for the state of
Rio de Janeiro. While in the state of Amapá, citizens can easily access detailed
information on each public employee in the state of Rio de Janeiro access to this
data is only granted if one has information on the name of the employee or his/her
tax identification number. An additional caveat of transparency websites is that
pre-disclosure data is usually not available.
To overcome those issues I use data on public sector pay from the Relação Anual
de Informações Sociais (RAIS), which is available for each year of the period be-
tween 2003 to 2015. RAIS is a matched employer-employee database that provides
universal coverage for Brazilian formal sector employees. For each tax-registered
plant, RAIS records detailed information for every worker in its employment dur-
ing the preceding calendar year. In particular, the data provides information on
occupation (six-digit code), industry, tenure, age, contractual hours, gender and
the (gross) average monthly wage of a worker over the employment spell during the
year. Earnings reported in RAIS include any forms of payment subject to social se-
curity contributions or taxable income such as regular salaries, holiday or vacation
bonuses, commissions and fees, hazard compensation, tips and gratuities.15
The RAIS database also provides detailed information on the legal form of the
employer establishment. This information is used to classify individuals as workers
of the private or public sector and to identify the specific level of government and
branch of power in which a civil servant works.
There are two groups of workers who do not appear on RAIS: elected politicians
and self-employed individuals. Hence, measures of wage dispersion of civil ser-
vants constructed from information on earnings and used in the empirical analysis
exclude salaries of elected officials.
Finally, although RAIS data is reported at the individual level, I have no infor-
mation that allows tracking individuals over time or across multiple employers. In
15See Menezes-Filho et al. (2008) for a full description of earnings reported in RAIS.
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the empirical analysis, I then use aggregate data on RAIS either at the municipal
or occupational level.
To account for differences in characteristics of municipalities located in states that
adopted transparency on pay and those located in states that did not adopt the
policy I use a large array of municipal covariates (both time invariant and time
varying). Time varying controls used in municipal level analysis for each year
between 2003 to 2015 are provided by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and
Statistics (IBGE) and include log population and log of real GDP per capita.
I additionally use administrative data on local budgets from a dataset named
FINBRA, provided by the Ministry of Finance (Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional),
to construct measures of intergovernmental transfers, expenditures and revenues
for each year between 2003 and 2015.
Time invariant municipal controls come from the 2000 census and were also pro-
vided by the IBGE. Variables used in local level analysis include the share of the
population with at least high school education, literacy rate, share of urban pop-
ulation, share of households with TV, share of households with radio, share of
households with a PC, and the Gini inequality index.
Data on gubernatorial electoral results for the period between 2002 and 2014
is provided by the Electoral Supreme Court (TSE). This data contains detailed
results for elections held at the state level, including vote totals, electoral turnout,
names and surnames of candidates, their party of affiliation, etc.
This study finally uses data from RAIS on average wages, age, tenure, number of
workers, share of female workers and share of workers with at least a secondary
degree, both at the municipal and occupational levels, for the period between 2003
to 2015.
Nominal wages, intergovernmental transfers, revenues and expenditures are all
measured in real terms and expressed in 2015 Brazilian Reals using the National
Consumer Price Index (́Indice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor - Amplo, IPCA),
which is also provided by the IBGE.
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics
This study focuses on civil servants of the executive branch, which is the branch
of government that is primarly responsible for the provision of public goods and
services across the country and as a result accounts for the majority of public em-
ployees. To illustrate, Figure 3.2 shows the average distribution of civil servants
between 2003 and 2015 across the different branches of power in the country. As
shown in the figure, more than 90% of Brazilian public employees work in the exec-
utive branch of either the federal, state or municipal governments.16 The empirical
analysis also restricts the sample to civil servants of state governments. Figure
3.3 show that those workers account for roughly 35% of all public servants work-
ing in the executive branch of the different administrative levels of the Brazilian
government.
The timing of wage disclosures across state governments of Brazil is illustrated
in Figure 3.4. Note that most states adopted the transparency policy just after
the central government posted earnings of its employees by name (June 2012). In
total, 15 out of the 26 states disclosed information on pay between July and August
of 2012. Nonetheless, there was substantial variation in adoption over time and
across states, with 7 states adopting the policy in different points in time between
January of 2013 and February of 2016. Finally, as of 2017, 4 state governments
had not yet disclosed data on pay of its employees.17 Since data on RAIS is not
available for years after 2015, states that adopted the policy after or at the end of
2015 are classified as non adopters throughout the empirical analysis.
Data reported on RAIS use a six-digit numerical system to define each occupation,
following the 2002 Brazil’s classification code called CBO (Classificação Brasileira
de Ocupações). In order to describe the typical occupations of public employees
working for state governments I use the first two of these six digits and group
occupations into 48 categories (instead of 1,716 individual occupations from the
six-digit level). I then mapped the CBO-2002 into the commonly used ISCO-88
16Others include civil servants of the Public Prosecutor’s Office.
17Note that the federal district is excluded from the analysis since it has no municipalities.
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(International Standard Classification of Occupations). These data is reported in
Table 3.1, which shows the average proportion of workers in the 10 most common
occupations in the period 2003-2015. Note that those occupations account for
more than 95% of all public servants working for state governments.
Consistent with the fact that state governments are responsible for providing ed-
ucational services and public security and also share with municipalities the obli-
gation for providing health services, the table shows that Teaching workers, Police
Officers and those in Health related occupations account for roughly 58% of all
state employees. Office Clerks, in turn, which is a common white-collar occupation
across government bureaucracies, represent around 19% of all state workers. Fi-
nally, Personal Services Workers and workers in senior managerial positions at the
state level, account for 8% and 7.8% of all the state’s civil servants, respectively.
To describe the evolution of earnings inequality in Brazil, I use municipal level
regressions of the top and bottom decile gaps (relative to the median) on year
and state dummies for each year between 2003 and 2015. Results are illustrated
in Figure 3.5 which presents trends in wage dispersion since 2003 for workers of
the executive branches in all levels of government and the private sector. In all
regressions, coefficients are measured using the first year of the series as baseline.
The dotted vertical line identifies the year the federal government passed the law
that mandated wage disclosure of its own employees. Panels A and B of the figure
indicate that there was an upward trend in wage inequality during the period both
at the upper and lower tails of the log earnings distribution. However, focusing
on the upper tail earnings inequality measured for central and state government
civil servants (illustrated in Panel A of the figure) the evidence suggests that there
was not much of a trend since 2011, which could be the result of pay disclosure
policies.18 Although the effect of pay disclosure on earnings of central government
employees cannot be separated from a time trend, the next section will examine
how pay transparency affected wage inequality of state government civil servants.
18Figure 3.A1 in the Appendix show trends in earnings inequality for state government em-
ployees using other decile gaps.
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3.5 Empirical Strategy
In order to investigate how wage transparency affects inequality of earnings in
the public sector, I start by using a differences-in-differences (DID) strategy that
exploits variation in the timing of adoption of pay transparency policies by state
governments of Brazil. In formulas,
Ymt = β0 + β1discst + γXmt + dm + dt + umt (3.1)
where Ymt measures the difference in logs of different wage percentiles with respect
to the median in municipality m located in state s in year t (that is, Ymt =
wpmt − w50mt, with p indicating different percentiles of the log wages distribution),
discst is a variable that equates 1 when state s discloses information on pay of
civil servants, Xmt is a vector that includes both time varying local characteristics
and baseline municipal controls interacted with year dummies, dm are municipal
dummies that control for municipal specific characteristics, dt year dummies that
control for unobservable shocks that equally affect all municipalities, and umt an
error term.
Building on the fact that state government employees might work in offices located
in different municipalities within a state, the unit of observation of this analysis
is a municipality m in a given year t. The proposed empirical strategy effectively
compares changes in wage dispersion of municipalities located in states that did
and did not adopt pay transparency before and after salaries were posted online.
Note that this strategy does not restrict the control group to states that never
posted data on earnings. Each municipality in states that did not disclose infor-
mation on pay at a particular point in time acts as control for municipalities in
states that already adopted pay transparency in that time period (even if the non-
disclosing state adopts the disclosure policy later on). The parameter β1 identifies
the causal effect of disclosure under the assumption that the policy adoption by
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state governments is not driven by unobservable characteristics of states that vary
over time.
An important caveat of the above analysis is that information on pay was not
disclosed at random across states. Thus, municipalities in non-disclosing states
might not represent a valid control group to those in states that adopted the
policy (even after conditioning on observables). The estimated effect of the policy
based on equation (3.1) might then be simply picking the effect of differential
trends in state-specific conditions.
To provide causal estimates of the effect of interest, I then employ an identification
strategy that uses the cross-state variation induced by the timing of adoption but
compares localities within states. In particular, it compares changes in the wage
dispersion of municipalities with high and low levels of inequality within states
that disclosed and did not disclose information on salaries. Inequality is measured
in the pre-policy period between 2003 and 2009 and defined as the average gap
between the different deciles of the log earnings distribution and the median of
civil servants working for that state government in different municipalities.
This strategy has the advantage of accounting for shocks contemporaneous to
the time a state government disclosed data on pay of its civil servants, such as
inequality trends across states or law changes correlated with the transparency
policy. Furthermore, the baseline level of earnings inequality for civil servants
working in a particular municipality is arguably exogenous to the fact that a state
government decided to disclose data on pay in a particular point in time. In
formulas,
Ymt = α0 + α1ineqmt0 ∗ discst + γXmt + dm + dst + umt (3.2)
where Ymst is defined as in equation (3.1), ineqmt0 is a measure of wage dispersion
for state government employees that work in municipality m in a baseline period
t0 before the policy was adopted by state s (that is, ineqmt0 = w
p
mt0 − w50mt0), dm
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is a municipality fixed effect, dst state dummies interacted with time effects, and
umt an error term.
3.6 Empirical Results
3.6.1 Baseline Results
Table 3.2 presents estimated coefficients of the DID model described by equation
(3.1). Each row of the Table corresponds to a different set of municipal level
regressions that estimate the average effect of the disclosure policy on decile wage
gaps with respect to the median, for civil servants of state governments, during
the period between 2003 and 2015. Robust standard errors shown in brackets are
clustered at the state level. All specifications include additive year and municipal
dummies.
Note that the inclusion of year dummies in regressions control for any shock
that contemporaneously affect all state governments, such as the transparency
law passed in 2010 that mandated online publishing of detailed information on
budget discussed in subsection 3.2.2. Municipality fixed effects, in turn, account
for latent wage differentials in localities across states. Nonetheless, municipalities
in states that disclosed and did not disclose salaries of civil servants might also
differ in observable characteristics that vary over time. To account for the fact that
those characteristics might be correlated with the transparency policy adopted by
state governments, in columns (2) and (3) I also estimate specifications that in-
clude municipal time varying controls and local baseline characteristics interacted
with year effects, respectively. Additionally, in an attempt to control for trends in
wage differentials, the specification presented in column (4) includes the average
gap for each decile in a baseline period (between 2003 and 2009) interacted with
year effects. Finally, in regressions in column (5) I add municipal linear trends to
address the fact that the effect of the policy on earnings differentials might also
be driven by differential trends in municipal-specific conditions.
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Focusing on estimated coefficients for decile gaps above median, in particular above
the eighth decile, evidence presented in Table 3.2 indicates that wage inequality
reduced significantly at the upper tail of the wage distribution as a result of the
adoption of pay transparency policies. Precisely, columns (1) to (4) in the first
row of the table show that the gap between the 99th percentile and median earn-
ings consistently decreased in all specifications presented. For instance, estimates
presented in column (4) show that disclosure reduces this gap by 7.6 percentage
points.
Note, additionally, that point estimates for percentiles above the median become
smaller in magnitude after the inclusion of municipal linear trends in the specifi-
cation presented in column (5) of Table 3.2. Moreover, the point estimate of the
gap between the 99th and the 50th percentiles becomes statistically insignificant
after the inclusion of this control. Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient for the
gap between the top decile and the median illustrated in the second row of column
(5) suggests that pay transparency reduced the 90-50 log inequality by 8.3 p.p.,
comparing states that adopted the policy with those that did not.
In turn, point estimates for decile gaps below the median, illustrated in columns
(1) to (5) of Table 3.2, do not suggest any significant changes in the wage inequality
at the bottom of the pay distribution. As shown in the table, this result is robust
to the inclusion of a different set of controls.
Overall, across state comparisons suggest that wage disclosure significantly changed
earnings differentials in the public sector, compressing wages at the top of the dis-
tribution. Interestingly, point estimates for all decile gaps above the median are
monotonically decreasing, despite being non significant up to the 8th decile, which
is consistent with the intuition that the effect of disclosure is expected to be more
salient at the top of the log wages distribution.
Nonetheless, it may be still of concern that some or all of the effect that has been
estimated using equation (3.1) is due to contemporaneous policy changes at the
state level that cannot be captured by municipality linear trends. In addition,
the timing of the online disclosure of pay information by state governments is
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not exogenous since the adoption of transparency policies was not random across
states.
In order to disentangle the effect of disclosure this study thus relies on a within
state comparison of municipalities with high and low levels of inequality at base-
line (before pay is disclosed by state governments). As defined in the previous
subsection inequality at baseline is simply a measure of the average difference be-
tween the log wage at the pth percentile and the log of the median at the municipal
level for the period 2003-2009 (for public servants working in state governments).
Importantly, the baseline level of wage dispersion in a particular municipality is
exogenous to the state decision to disclose the pay of its employees by name.
Table 3.3 presents regression results of the DID strategy based on equation (3.2).
As before, each row in the table refers to a separate regression of the gap be-
tween consecutive deciles of the log wages distribution and the fifth decile. The
independent variable that measures the causal effect of interest, however, is the
interaction between the disclosure dummy and the level of wage dispersion mea-
sured in the pre-policy baseline period. In addition to municipality fixed effects,
all specifications presented in the table include state dummies interacted with year
effects. This allows us to additionally control for unobserved state-specific factors
that might change with states over time and could be driving the effects of pay
transparency.
Estimates presented in columns (1) to (3) of the table indicate that earnings
were significantly compressed within states for decile gaps above the median with
the opposite occurring for gaps below the fifth decile. For instance, regression
coefficients of the gap between the 9th and the fifth decile shown in the second
row of column (3), suggest that if the baseline difference in wage dispersion of
municipalities with high and low levels of inequality is 10 percentage points apart
(comparing localities in states that disclosed data on pay) this gap is reduced by
2.7 p.p. once data on salaries of employees are posted online by states. In turn, the
point estimate of the gap between the bottom decile and the median, presented in
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the last row of column (3), shows that the adoption of the policy further increases
this gap by roughly 1.7 p.p.
Regressions presented in column (4) of the table include an interaction between the
municipal level of inequality measured at baseline and year dummies. This speci-
fication allows the baseline level of inequality to have different effects at different
points in time and localities, controlling also for differential trends in inequality.
Note that point estimates of wage differentials displayed in this column are now
mostly statistically insignificant, indicating that part of the effects described in
columns (1) to (3) of the table were driven by inequality trends.
On the other hand, the estimated coefficient of the 90-50 decile gap is significantly
negative even after accounting for trends in wage dispersion of state government
employees. While the effects are smaller in magnitude in comparison to those
presented in column (3), this result indicates that wage disclosure significantly
affected the top of the log earnings distribution. Precisely, the point estimate of
this wage gap shown in the second row of column (4) suggests that the adoption of
pay transparency by states reduced this log earnings gap by 1.5 p.p. in localities
where the baseline gap was 10 p.p. apart.
In an additional attempt to control for specific-local shocks that might also affect
the wage gap of state government employees, the specification presented in column
(5) of Table 3.3 includes municipal linear trends. Importantly, point estimates for
the ninth and eighth deciles relative to the fifth presented in the second and third
rows of column (5) are both significantly negative. Finally, estimates for gaps at
the bottom decile of the distribution are non significant, suggesting that disclosure
of pay affects mostly the upper tail of the log earnings distribution in the public
sector.
3.6.2 Returns to Occupations versus Composition
The previous subsection established that disclosure of wages of the state bureau-
cracy compressed pay in the public sector. The evidence presented also suggests
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that effects are concentrated among workers with wages above median earnings
and in particular at the upper tail of the log earnings distribution. Occupations
might be an important channel to assess how the wage structure in the public
sector was affected by pay transparency. Furthermore, point estimates indicating
wage compression at the local level might be the result of compositional changes in
top paid occupations rather than changes in returns to these occupations. To shed
light on these, this study uses the following regression to examine how the average
returns and the composition of workers in top paid jobs of state governments were
affected by pay disclosure policies:
Yimt = δ0 + δ1Topis ∗ discst + dim + dmt + dit + uimt (3.3)
where Yimt is the average log earnings or the share of workers in occupation i in
municipality m and year t, Topis is the share of top earners in occupation i and
state s, discst is defined as previously, dim is an occupation and municipality fixed
effect that controls for unobservables that might affect an occupation in a given
municipality, dmt is a municipality and year fixed effect that control for municipal
trends or institutional changes that might affect different municipalities over time,
dit is an occupation and time fixed effect that accounts for occupations time specific
effects, and uimt an error term.
19
As described in section 3.4, an occupation is defined using the first two out of
the six digits provided by the CBO-2002 classification system, which leads to 48
occupations. Top paid jobs in state governments are defined using a ranking of
occupations and earnings within states to account for the fact that each state
government has autonomy to decide the pay of their employees and for differences
in earnings across states. Specifically, a top paid job is defined as the average
share of workers in the top vingtile, decile or percentile, in a given occupation i
and state s over the period 2003-2015.
19Note that equation (3.3) follows from equation (3.1) but estimated at the occupational level.
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Table 3.4 describes the 10 highest-paying jobs (out of 48 jobs) in state governments
across Brazil. Occupations in the table are ranked according to the share of workers
in the top percentile as shown in column (1). Note that the 10 jobs displayed in the
table account for roughly 17% of all state civil servants, as illustrated in column (4).
Among the occupations with highest share of earners in the top percentile are Legal
Professionals, Social, Arts and Humanities Professionals, Science and Engineering
Professionals, Life Science Professionals and Health Professionals (together with
Firefighters, managers of different offices at the state level and senior officials
working for state governments).20
Columns (1) to (6) of Table 3.5 present estimated coefficients of regressions based
on equation (3.3). Panel A describes the effect of pay disclosure on the returns to
top paid occupations while Panel B shows the impact on the composition of those
occupations. All regressions are weighted by the number of workers in occupation
i, state s and year t and robust standard errors are clustered at the state level
and reported in brackets. Note also that regressions displayed in columns (2), (4)
and (6) of the table additionally include time varying occupational controls with
respect to those presented in equation (3.3). Those controls attempt to account
for trends in characteristics of occupations that might also vary by municipality.
Specifically, those specifications include average age, tenure, number of workers,
share of female workers and share of workers with at least high school education
in a certain occupation i, municipality m and year t.
Focusing on point estimates illustrated in columns (1) to (6) of the top panel of
the table, results indicate that the average returns to top paid jobs consistently
decreased as a result of the adoption of pay transparency policies. For instance,
the point estimate presented in column (1) indicates that, once data on pay is
posted online in the state where an occupation is distributed, a 10 percentage
20Top paid earners classified as Legal Professionals include state prosecutors, attorneys and
police commissioners (chief officers). Social, Arts and Humanities Professionals include mainly
tax auditors, economists and political scientists. Science and Engineering Professionals include
workers in different engineering sectors, IT workers, aircraft pilots and architects. Life Science
Professionals include forensic experts, plant biology and agronomy researchers. Note also that
Firefighters are an auxiliary force of the Brazilian Army. Thus, Firefighters among top earners are
mainly those individuals with the highest military ranks within Brazilian Military Firefighters.
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point increase in the share of earners in the top 20% decreases the returns to this
occupation by 2.1%. Similarly, the estimated coefficient displayed in column (3)
shows that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of earners in the top 10%
reduces the returns to this job by 3.1%. Note also that additionally controlling
for time varying characteristics of occupations at the local level does not alter
the significance of point estimates, as illustrated in columns (2) and (4), which
provides evidence that changes in returns were not driven by differential changes
in characteristics of top paid jobs, such as changes in gender or age structure.
Interestingly, the effect of disclosure on returns to top paid jobs displayed in
columns (1) to (6) of Panel A is increasing in absolute terms according to the
definition of a top paid occupation. That is, although non statistically significant
as illustrated in columns (5) and (6), the impact of pay transparency is stronger
for top paid jobs defined as the share of workers in the top 1% than for those
defined as the share in the top 10% or 20%, which seems consistent with findings
presented in Table 3.2.21
Figure 3.6 illustrates the relation between the compression in returns as a result
of disclosure and the share of workers in top paid jobs. Each figure present scatter
plots of estimated coefficients drawn from regressions of the the interaction be-
tween the disclosure dummy and occupation dummies on the average log earnings
by occupation and the share of workers in the top vingtile (Panel A) and top decile
(Panel B).22 Point estimates of regressions on returns per occupation are measured
using the occupation with the lowest share of workers in the top 20% and 10%
as baseline (that is, other workers of conservation, maintenance and repair) and
presented in the vertical axis. The share of earners in the top 20% and 10%, in
turn, is displayed in the horizontal axis of each figure.
21For transparency, Table 3.A1 in the Appendix presents point estimates for regressions using
an alternative definition of top paid jobs. In particular, occupations are ranked according to
earnings in all the country rather than by state. Similarly, a top paid occupation is then defined
as the average share of workers in the top vingtile, decile or percentile, in a given occupation i
throughout the period between 2003-2015. Results in the table are consistent to those illustrated
in Table 3.5.
22Returns by occupation are estimated using the following regression: Yimt = δ0 + δ2discst ∗
di +dim +dmt +dit +ηXimt +uimt, with Ximt being a vector of time varying local characteristics
of occupations as previously described.
Chapter 3. Wage Transparency in Brazil 110
Consistent with results presented in columns (2) and (4) of Table 3.5, the fitted
red lines in Figure 3.6 indicate that there is a strong negative correlation between
the share of workers in the top vingtile or decile of an occupation and the esti-
mated returns for this job once pay information is posted online by state govern-
ments.23 Notably, as one would expect, occupations such as Legal Professionals,
Life Science Professionals, Science and Engineering Professionals and Administra-
tive Managers, which are listed in Table 3.4, that rank occupations according to
the share of top earners, are among the most affected by the pay transparency
policies.
Finally, the results presented in columns (1) to (6) of Panel B of Table 3.5 indicate
that the effect of releasing data on pay of civil servants on the share of workers in
top paid occupations is not significantly different from zero. As shown in columns
(2), (4) and (6) of the table, this result is also robust to the inclusion of local
time varying observable characteristics of occupations. Indeed Figure 3.7 shows
that the correlation between the share of top paid workers per occupation and
estimated coefficients from regressions of the interaction between the disclosure
dummy and occupation dummies on the share of workers is approximately zero,
suggesting that disclosure did not change the size of top paid occupations relative
to low paying jobs.
3.6.3 Robustness Checks
The main analysis of this study focuses on earnings differentials of civil servants
working for state governments. Although some spillover effects might propagate to
the local bureaucracy, impacting wage differentials of municipal public employees,
it is not likely that the policy adopted by states would have affected workers of the
central government. 24 As discussed, disclosure of information on pay (mandated
23Estimated coefficients of regressions presented in Panels A and B of the figure illustrated by
the red fitted lines are -0.36 and -0.39, respectively, with both being significantly negative at 5%.
24It should be noted that one could have expected that municipalities were pushed to adopt
pay transparency policies by state governments or other public bodies at the state level, such as
the state public prosecutor’s office, just after state administrations where this municipalities are
located disclosed wages online.
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by law) affected all central government employees across the country at the same
point in time. As a placebo, I then use the timing of adoption of pay transparency
policies by states to examine the effects of disclosure on wage differentials of public
servants working for the federal and local governments.
Table 3.A2 in the Appendix of this chapter presents regression results of this
placebo exercise using within state comparisons described by equation (3.2). Esti-
mated coefficients reported in columns (1) to (3) and (6) to (8) of the table follow
the pattern illustrated in Table 3.3 with wage inequality within states decreasing
at the upper tail of the wage distribution and increasing at the lower tail as a re-
sult of disclosure (both for employees of the central and local governments). Note,
however, that once the interaction between year dummies and the baseline level of
inequality is included in regressions, most of the effect of the pay disclosure van-
ishes, as shown in columns (4) and (9) of the table. These results are confirmed
in the specification that additionally controls for municipal time specific effects
presented in columns (5) and (10).
In sum, the results in Table 3.A2 indicate that there was no differential change on
earnings inequality of civil servants of the central government as a result of states
having disclosed salaries of their employees. Additionally, evidence suggests no
spillover effects in the wage dispersion of municipal employees.
3.6.4 Possible Mechanisms
The evidence discussed so far suggests that earnings at the top of the distribu-
tion compressed in comparison to the median (both across and within states) as
a result of state governments adopting pay transparency policies. Since in Brazil
elected officials for the executive branch of power face a two-term limit, electoral
accountability might be a plausible explanation for earnings compression at the
top. Governors in their first term could be more likely to reduce the gap between
top and median earners within the public sector than those in their second term
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since they fear being punished by voters when running for reelection (in partic-
ular if the information their administrations disclose reveal a high disconnection
between salaries and skills of civil servants, which could signal to rents that accrue
to holding public sector jobs).
In order to shed light on this mechanism I further interact the independent variable
of interest of equation (3.1) with a dummy that equals one if there is a first term
governor in power in state s and year t, and zero otherwise. Table 3.A3 in the
Appendix presents estimated coefficients of this interaction, focusing on decile
gaps starting from the 6th decile relative to median earnings.
Results displayed in columns (1) to (6) of the table show that earnings inequality at
the upper tail of the log earnings distribution is more likely to decrease when there
is a first term governor in power in a disclosing state. It should be noted, however,
that estimates are only significant when running the specification presented in
column (3), that additionally controls for time varying local characteristics and
allows for baseline covariates to have specific effects in each municipality. After
allowing for the baseline level of wages inequality to have time specific effects in
each locality, which could possibly account for inequality trends from baseline,
point estimates lose precision and become non significant, as shown in column (4)
of the table.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper I used linked employer-employee data from Brazil for the period
between 2003 and 2015 to analyze the effect of pay transparency on the wage dis-
persion within the public sector. The study presents evidence that the adoption
of transparency by Brazilian states affected earnings inequality both across and
within states, with effects concentrated at top of the log earnings distribution.
Importantly, decile gaps below the median do not seem to have been differen-
tially affected by transparency policies both comparing localities across and within
states.
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In line with evidence presented, top paid occupations of state governments, such as
Legal Professionals, Life Science Professionals or Administrative Managers, faced
a higher compression on earnings than lower paid occupations as a result of state
administrations having adopted pay transparency policies. Moreover, there was
no evidence that the share of workers in top paid jobs was affected by disclosure,
which seems to suggest that indeed the compression at the upper tail of the log
wages distribution is driven by lower returns rather than compositional effects.
Although the estimates presented are not robust it seems that governors in their
first term are more likely to reduce earnings inequality for civil servants working
at the state level than their second-term counterparts, which is consistent with a
mechanism of electoral accountability.
Finally, the results presented seem consistent with previous works that analyzed
the effect of mandated disclosure of salaries on pay compensation of workers and
showed that the effect of policies that revealed wages are more likely to affect top
earners (Mas (2016) and Mas (2017)).
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Tables and Figures
Figure 3.1 Information on Pay of Civil Servants of State Governments
Panel A: State of Amapa
Panel B: State of Rio de Janeiro
Notes: the figures illustrate how data on pay of state government employees is displayed to
citizens on transparency websites of two Brazilian states. The first panel show data for the
state of Amapá while the second for the state of Rio de Janeiro.
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Figure 3.2 Civil Servants by Branch of Power - %
Notes: The figure shows the average percentage of civil servants working in the different
branches of government of Brazil from 2003 to 2015. The Others category in the figure refers to
Prosecutor’s Public Office employees.
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Figure 3.3 Civil Servants in the Executive Branch by Administrative Level -
%
Notes: the figure shows the average percentage of public servants working for the executive
branch of power in one of the three administrative levels of government of Brazil (Federal,
State and Municipal) between 2003-2015.
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Figure 3.4 Timing of Disclosure of Civil Servants Pay by State Governments
Notes: the figure illustrates the timing of disclosure of information on pay at the individual
level by each state government of Brazil.
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Teaching Associate Professionals 16.1
Police Officers 12.0
Personal Services Workers 8.0
Chief Executives and Senior Officials 7.8
Health Associate Professionals 3.6
Health Professionals 3.5
Business Associate Professionals 3.4
Social, Arts and Humanities Professionals 1.8
Notes: the Table shows the average proportion of civil servants work-
ing for state governments for the period between 2003 and 2015 in
the 10 most common occupations. Occupations are aggregated at the
two-digit level using RAIS data and ranked by 1 to 10.
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Figure 3.5 Inequality Trends
Panel A: Evolution of upper tail inequality
Panel B: Evolution of lower tail inequality
Notes: the figures illustrate inequality trends at the upper (Panel A) and the lower tails of the log earnings
distribution (Panel B) from 2003 to 2015 for civil servants of the executive branch of the central, state and local
governments and also private sector workers. Each point in the figure represents an estimated coefficient from
regressions of the gap between the top and bottom deciles with respect to median wages on year and state
dummies. Estimated coefficients are measured using the year of 2003 as baseline.
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Figure 3.6 Returns to Occupations and Share of Top Paid Workers
Panel A: Top 20%
Panel B: Top 10%
Notes: the figures show the relation between the returns to occupations in disclosing states and the share of
workers in top paid occupations. The vertical axis of each panel displays the point estimates from the regression
of the interaction of the disclosure dummy with occupation dummies on average log earnings by occupation.
Point estimates of this regression are measured relative to the occupation with the lowest share of top paid
workers. The horizontal axis show the share of workers in each occupation that are in the top vingtile (Panel A)
and top decile (Panel B).
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Figure 3.7 Composition of Occupations and Share of Top Paid Workers
Panel A: Top 20%
Panel B: Top 10%
Notes: the figures show the relation between the composition of occupations in disclosing states and the share of
workers in top paid occupations. The vertical axis of each panel displays the point estimates from the regression
of the interaction of the disclosure dummy with occupation dummies on average log earnings by occupation.
Point estimates of this regression are measured relative to the occupation with the lowest share of top paid
workers. The horizontal axis show the share of workers in each occupation that are in the top vingtile (Panel A)
and top decile (Panel B).
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Table 3.2 Effect of transparency in the public sector on wage
differentials across states: 2003 to 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dep. variables State Level Employees
p99-50 -0.129* -0.115** -0.061* -0.076** -0.097
(0.074) (0.050) (0.035) (0.031) (0.064)
p90-50 -0.058* -0.052 -0.050 -0.055* -0.083*
(0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.043)
p80-50 -0.027 -0.028 -0.016 -0.023 -0.046
(0.037) (0.038) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030)
p70-50 -0.012 -0.009 -0.003 -0.012 -0.026
(0.021) (0.023) (0.017) (0.018) (0.027)
p60-50 -0.000 0.005 0.010 0.004 -0.007
(0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
p40-50 0.006 -0.001 -0.002 -0.018 -0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013)
p30-50 -0.003 -0.015 -0.019 -0.028 -0.004
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.021)
p20-50 0.003 -0.011 -0.005 -0.012 0.022
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.027) (0.025)
p10-50 0.001 -0.013 0.018 0.010 0.028
(0.031) (0.027) (0.033) (0.040) (0.028)
N 3,256 3,256 3,256 3,062 3,062
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls x Time FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Inequality x Time FE No No No Yes Yes
Municipal Linear Trends No No No No Yes
Notes: The table shows point estimates of DID regressions of equation (3.1). The
dependent variable is the log(p)-log(p50) in municipality m and year t, where p indi-
cates the percentile. The independent variable is a dummy that equals 1 when state
governments disclose pay information. Time varying municipal controls include logs of
population, real GDP per capita, real transfers per capita, real expenditure, real rev-
enue and number of civil servants. It also include average age, tenure, share of females
and share of workers with at least high school degree. Baseline municipal covariates
interacted with year dummies are based on the 2000 Brazilian Census and include the
literacy rate, share of households with radio, share of households with TV, share of
households with a PC, share of urban population and Gini index. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses. Significance ***at
1% level, **at 5%level, *at 10%level.
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Table 3.3 Effect of transparency in the public sector on wage differentials
within states: 2003 to 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dep. variables State Level Employees
p99-50 -0.188*** -0.171*** -0.216*** -0.057 -0.068
(0.049) (0.032) (0.031) (0.050) (0.102)
p90-50 -0.237*** -0.219*** -0.269*** -0.147* -0.221***
(0.061) (0.048) (0.049) (0.074) (0.055)
p80-50 -0.274*** -0.260*** -0.309*** -0.080 -0.171*
(0.030) (0.028) (0.031) (0.057) (0.088)
p70-50 -0.350*** -0.342*** -0.405*** -0.075 -0.101
(0.033) (0.036) (0.047) (0.114) (0.134)
p60-50 -0.338*** -0.324*** -0.360*** -0.139 -0.089
(0.062) (0.061) (0.074) (0.178) (0.290)
p40-50 -0.277** -0.256** -0.276** -0.104 0.066
(0.103) (0.103) (0.114) (0.140) (0.171)
p30-50 -0.233*** -0.207** -0.233** -0.201* -0.111
(0.083) (0.079) (0.088) (0.105) (0.145)
p20-50 -0.209*** -0.183*** -0.210*** -0.321*** -0.201
(0.048) (0.053) (0.056) (0.085) (0.136)
p10-50 -0.166*** -0.138** -0.167** -0.117 -0.120
(0.056) (0.064) (0.071) (0.172) (0.129)
N 2,993 2,993 2,993 2,993 2,993
Year FE x State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls x Time FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Inequality x Time FE No No No Yes Yes
Municipal Linear Trends No No No No Yes
Notes: The table shows point estimates of DID regressions of equation (3.2). The dependent
variable is the log(p)-log(p50) in municipality m and year t, where p indicates the percentile.
The independent variable is the interaction of a dummy that equals 1 when state governments
disclose pay information and the average log(p)-log(p50) in municipality m at baseline. Time
varying municipal controls include logs of population, real GDP per capita, real transfers per
capita, real expenditure, real revenue and number of civil servants. It also include average
age, tenure, share of females and share of workers with at least high school degree. Baseline
municipal covariates interacted with year dummies are based on the 2000 Brazilian Census and
include the literacy rate, share of households with radio, share of households with TV, share
of households with a PC, share of urban population and Gini index. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses. Significance ***at 1% level, **at
5%level, *at 10%level.
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Table 3.4 Ranking of Top Paid Occupations in State Governments
Ni99/Ni Ni90/Ni Ni80/Ni Ni/N
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Legal Professionals 40.2 83.7 89.6 0.9
Social, Arts and Humanities Professionals 13.9 54.8 67.8 1.8
Administrative Managers 9.2 57.9 70.2 0.3
Chief Executives and Senior Officials 5.8 35.2 48.0 7.8
Science and Engineering Professionals 4.5 56.8 75.1 0.3
Firefighters 2.9 24.5 42.4 1.7
Life Science Professionals 1.8 74.9 86.4 0.2
Other Managers 1.5 33.7 49.3 0.2
Specialist Managers 1.3 34.0 51.2 0.7
Health Professionals 1.1 39.9 63.6 3.5
Notes: the Table shows the proportion of civil servants in top paid occupations of state governments. Occupations
are aggregated at the two-digit level using RAIS data as described in subsection 3.4. Specifically, columns (1) to
(3) illustrate the percentage of workers in occupation i that earn equal or above the top percentile, decile and
vingtile, respectively. Column (4) shows the proportion of workers in occupation i among all public servants of state
governments.
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Table 3.5 Returns and Composition of Top Paying Occupations from 2003 to
2015
Top 20% Top 10% Top 1%
dep. variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Average returns to occupations
log(wages) -0.215** -0.190** -0.312*** -0.257** -0.474 -0.378
(0.098) (0.086) (0.102) (0.096) (0.369) (0.323)
R-squared 0.945 0.954 0.945 0.954 0.945 0.954
Panel B: Composition of occupations
share of workers -0.045 -0.039 -0.045 -0.039 0.309 0.196
(0.047) (0.035) (0.046) (0.033) (0.223) (0.117)
R-squared 0.960 0.976 0.960 0.976 0.960 0.976
N 27,885 27,885 27,885 27,885 27,885 27,885
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation x Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying Occupational Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table shows the effect of disclosure on average log wages or the share of workers in top paying occupations
of state governments. The unit of observation is an occupation in a given municipality and year. The dependent variable
is the average log wages (Panel A) or the share of workers (Panel B) in occupation i, municipality m, year t. The
independent variable is the interaction of a dummy that equals 1 once state governments disclose data on pay (and 0
otherwise) and the share of top paid workers in occupation i and state s. Top paid occupations are defined, respectively,
as the share of workers in the top 20%, 10% or 1% of the log earnings distribution of a given state in each occupation.
All specifications are weighted by the number of workers per occupation in a given state. Time varying controls at the
occupational level include the average share of female workers, tenure, age, number of workers and the average share
of workers with at least primary education. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in
parentheses. Significance ***at 1% level, **at 5%level, *at 10%level.
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Appendix 3.A Supplementary tables and figures
Figure 3.A1 Inequality Trends - State Governments
Panel A: Evolution Inequality in State Governments
Panel B: Evolution of lower and upper tail inequality
Notes: panel A of the figure reports inequality trends for state governments for different decile gaps of the log
earnings distribution. Panel B of the figure reports trends in the decile gap p(90)-p(50) for states with high and
low levels of inequality measure in the period 2003-2009.
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Table 3.A1 Returns and Composition of Top Paying Occupations -
Nationwide Ranking
Top 20% Top 10% Top 1%
dep. variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Average returns to occupations
log(wages) -0.157 -0.246** -0.279 -0.314* -0.874* -0.662
(0.154) (0.116) (0.174) (0.167) (0.431) (0.480)
R-squared 0.945 0.960 0.945 0.960 0.945 0.960
Panel B: Composition of occupations
share of workers -0.048 0.021 -0.066 0.007 -0.185 -0.052
(0.051) (0.035) (0.065) (0.040) (0.188) (0.110)
R-squared 0.960 0.976 0.960 0.976 0.960 0.976
N 27,885 27,885 27,885 27,885 27,885 27,885
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation x Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying Occupational Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table shows the effect of disclosure on average log wages or the share of workers in top paying occupations of
state governments. The unit of observation is an occupation in a given municipality and year. The dependent variable
is the average log wages (Panel A) or the share of workers (Panel B) in occupation i, municipality m, year t. The
independent variable is the interaction of a dummy that equals 1 once state governments disclose data on pay (and 0
otherwise) and the share of top paid workers in occupation i. Top paid occupations are defined, respectively, as the share
of workers in the top 20%, 10% or 1% of the log earnings distribution of Brazil in each occupation. All specifications
are weighted by the number of workers per occupation in a given state. Time varying controls at the occupational level
include the average share of female workers, tenure, age, number of workers and the average share of workers with least
primary education. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses. Significance
***at 1% level, **at 5%level, *at 10%level.
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Table 3.A2 Placebo test on employees of other levels of government: 2003 to
2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
dep. variables Federal Level Municipal Level
p99-50 -0.375*** -0.319*** -0.301*** -0.021 -0.009 -0.490*** -0.463*** -0.474*** 0.046 -0.028
(0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.039) (0.034) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.036) (0.046)
p90-50 -0.328*** -0.323*** -0.321*** -0.045 0.104 -0.471*** -0.456*** -0.466*** -0.058 0.014
(0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.064) (0.077) (0.028) (0.027) (0.024) (0.052) (0.045)
p80-50 -0.341*** -0.361*** -0.361*** -0.070 0.060 -0.457*** -0.445*** -0.452*** -0.071 -0.043
(0.036) (0.038) (0.044) (0.059) (0.070) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.048) (0.036)
p70-50 -0.376*** -0.391*** -0.402*** -0.100 0.043 -0.483*** -0.477*** -0.483*** -0.041 -0.071
(0.044) (0.045) (0.041) (0.064) (0.052) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.027) (0.047)
p60-50 -0.436*** -0.449*** -0.463*** -0.054 -0.042 -0.560*** -0.557*** -0.561*** 0.009 -0.101
(0.077) (0.074) (0.067) (0.137) (0.128) (0.032) (0.030) (0.026) (0.044) (0.061)
p40-50 -0.426*** -0.436*** -0.460*** -0.004 0.064 -0.522*** -0.524*** -0.530*** 0.034 0.027
(0.055) (0.053) (0.047) (0.149) (0.185) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.037) (0.078)
p30-50 -0.364*** -0.379*** -0.429*** -0.047 -0.062 -0.444*** -0.445*** -0.460*** 0.050 0.018
(0.037) (0.038) (0.041) (0.107) (0.264) (0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.053)
p20-50 -0.296*** -0.314*** -0.366*** 0.034 -0.033 -0.414*** -0.417*** -0.439*** 0.032 -0.002
(0.032) (0.036) (0.043) (0.116) (0.206) (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.031) (0.037)
p10-50 -0.194*** -0.201*** -0.252*** 0.002 0.039 -0.387*** -0.389*** -0.415*** 0.004 -0.022
(0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.080) (0.159) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.033) (0.036)
N 10,727 10,727 10,727 10,727 10,727 71,160 71,160 71,160 71,160 71,160
Year FE x State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls x Time FE No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Ineq. x Time FE No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Municipality Linear Trends No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Notes: The table shows DID regressions of equation (3.2). The dependent variable is the log(p)-log(p50) in municipality m
and year t, where p indicates the percentile. The independent variable is the interaction of a dummy that equals 1 when state
governments disclose pay information and the average log(p)-log(p50) in municipality m at baseline. Time varying municipal
controls include logs of population, real GDP per capita, real transfers per capita, real expenditure, real revenue and number
of civil servants. It also include average age, tenure, share of women and share of workers with at least high school degree.
Baseline municipal covariates interacted with year dummies are based on the 2000 Brazilian Census and include the literacy
rate, share of households with radio, share of households with TV, share of households with a PC, share of urban population
and Gini index. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses. Significance ***at 1%
level, **at 5%level, *at 10%level.
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Table 3.A3 Governor Term Limits and Wage Transparency across states:
2003 to 2015
dep. variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
p99-50 -0.021 -0.020 -0.037 -0.021
(0.075) (0.058) (0.042) (0.053)
p90-50 -0.021 -0.013 -0.038* -0.024
(0.034) (0.025) (0.022) (0.026)
p80-50 -0.037 -0.032 -0.055** -0.040
(0.026) (0.021) (0.022) (0.026)
p70-50 -0.021 -0.019 -0.036* -0.025
(0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
p60-50 -0.015 -0.013 -0.014 -0.012
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)
N 3,256 3,256 3,256 3,062
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls x Time FE No No Yes Yes
Baseline Inequality x Time FE No No No Yes
Notes: The table shows point estimates of DID regressions based on equa-
tion (3.1). The dependent variable is the log(p)-log(p50) in municipality m
and year t, where p indicates the percentile. The independent variable of
interest is the interaction of a dummy that equals 1 when state governments
disclose pay information and a dummy that is equal to one when there is a
first term governor in state s and time t. Time varying municipal controls
include logs of population, real GDP per capita, real transfers per capita,
real expenditure, real revenue and number of civil servants. It also include
average age, tenure, share of females and share of workers with at least high
school degree. Baseline municipal covariates interacted with year dummies
are based on the 2000 Brazilian Census and include the literacy rate, share
of households with radio, share of households with TV, share of households
with a PC, share of urban population and Gini index. Robust standard er-
rors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses. Significance
***at 1% level, **at 5%level, *at 10%level.
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